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CRIMINAL JUSTICE EXPERTISE
Benjamin Levin*
For decades, commentators have adopted a story of mass incarceration’s
rise as caused by “punitive populism.” Growing prison populations,
expanding criminal codes, and raced and classed disparities in enforcement
result from “pathological politics”: voters and politicians act in a vicious
feedback loop, driving more criminal law and punishment. The criminal
system’s problems are political. But how should society solve these political
problems? Scholars often identify two kinds of approaches: (1) the
technocratic, which seeks to wrest power from irrational and punitive voters,
replacing electoral politics with agencies and commissions, and (2) the
democratic, which treats criminal policy as insufficiently responsive to
community will and seeks to shift more power to “the people.” Put
differently, commentators often suggest that the critical prescriptive
disagreement boils down to one about expertise and its role—should experts
or nonexperts be the most powerful actors in criminal policymaking?
In this Article, though, I argue that the key fault line between visions of
change is not the one between proponents and opponents of expertise; rather,
competing camps are advancing different visions of expertise. In an effort to
understand better the landscape and stakes of the expert turn(s), I map out
three different conceptions of expertise: (1) expertise based on vocation
(e.g., the police officer or the judge); (2) expertise based on education (e.g.,
the professor or the criminologist); and (3) expertise based on lived,
day-to-day experience (e.g., the incarcerated person or the crime victim).
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The third conception increasingly underpins many of the “democratic”
responses.
I raise a series of questions implicated by the expert turn—whichever
approach to expertise one adopts. I argue that any turn to expertise requires
a set of shared first principles. Given widespread debate about the values
that should govern the criminal system, how should experts go about
addressing contested policy questions? Additionally, I argue that these
conceptions of expertise are slipperier than they appear—who gets to decide
what constitutes expertise, and who gets to be an expert? Rather than
eliminating politics from the administration of criminal law, a turn to
expertise shifts the location of political decisions to the stage of identifying
experts. Unpacking and surfacing those decisions should be an important
part of any way forward toward institutional change. By looking more
closely at how society understands which voices to privilege and how those
voices should shape policy, we can better appreciate first-principles
disagreements about criminal law and governance.
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INTRODUCTION
It is a strange time to be writing about experts. This Article is the product
of a moment when expertise occupies a fraught place in U.S. political culture.
An impression of widespread impulsiveness defined many characterizations
of the Trump administration and led to calls for “experts” to return to
power—from progressives’ embrace of Robert Mueller and the intelligence
community to the celebration of career prosecutors and highly credentialed
doctors and scientists.1 In spring 2017, Trump opponents rallied in large
numbers for a “March for Science,” framing science alternatively as neutral
and apolitical (and therefore superior to Trumpian visceral politics) or clearly
supporting policy positions favored by progressives.2
And, the
administration’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic led to calls from the
left (broadly conceived) for politicians to defer to doctors and scientists.3
At the same time, traditional sources of authority and expertise have
sustained fire from corners of the political left. During the summer of 2020,
protests to confront structural racism and state violence against Black people
have called for a reckoning with the ways in which dominant social and
political institutions have maintained racial hierarchy. As activists and riot
squads squared off, demands to defund and dismantle police forces came to
supplant requests for better training, more transparency, and greater
accountability for officers.4 And, calls to abolish police and prisons have
entered the mainstream, appearing in the pages of popular press publications
from Rolling Stone and Teen Vogue to The New York Times.5 For a growing
1. See, e.g., Spencer S. Hsu, Hearing Sought in Justice Dept. Bid to Undo Flynn Guilty
Plea, as Nearly 1,000 Ex-Prosecutors Prepare to Oppose Conviction Reversal, WASH. P OST
(May 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/hearing-sought-injustice-dept-bid-to-undo-flynn-guilty-plea-as-1000-ex-prosecutors-prepare-to-opposeconviction-reversal/2020/05/18/5b762684-9872-11ea-a282-386f56d579e6_story.html
[https://perma.cc/P82H-6AVE]; Niall Stanage, The Memo: Trump Era Flips Script on Views
of Intelligence Agencies, THE H ILL (Dec. 18, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/
administration/475009-the-memo-trump-era-flips-script-on-views-of-intelligence-agencies
[https://perma.cc/CA9K-QR5L].
2. See Ed Yong, What Exactly Are People Marching for When They March for Science?,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03/whatexactly-are-people-marching-for-when-they-march-for-science/518763/
[https://perma.cc/JP2U-D6ZM].
3. See, e.g., Linda Qiu, Bill Marsh & Jon Huang, The President vs. the Experts: How
Trump Played Down the Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/03/18/us/trump-coronavirus-statements-timeline.html
[https://perma.cc/H4RA-VN65].
4. See, e.g., Ruairí Arrieta-Kenna, The Deep Roots—and New Offshoots—of “Abolish
the Police,” P OLITICO (June 12, 2020, 7:30 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/
2020/06/12/abolish-defund-police-explainer-316185
[https://perma.cc/D57M-MVJV];
Mariame Kaba, Opinion, Yes, We Mean Literally Abolish the Police, N.Y. TIMES
(June 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/opinion/sunday/floyd-abolish-defundpolice.html [https://perma.cc/Z4GB-4ZLS].
5. See, e.g., Kim Kelly, Opinion, What the Prison-Abolition Movement Wants, TEEN
V OGUE (Dec. 26, 2019), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/what-is-prison-abolitionmovement [https://perma.cc/B558-3YNN]; Rachel Kushner, Is Prison Necessary?: Ruth
Wilson Gilmore Might Change Your Mind, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/magazine/prison-abolition-ruth-wilson-gilmore.html
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group of commentators, then, experts and their technocratic solutions have
been woefully unprepared to address deep, systemic injustice.6
In this Article, I examine that tension and the fraught status of expertise in
debates about criminal justice reform and transformation. Is criminal policy
a realm (perhaps like public health) where greater deference to the right
experts would yield better policy? Or is the turn to expertise part of what’s
wrong with the criminal system? Who is an expert? And what are the costs
and benefits of using “expertise” as a frame through which to make and
assess criminal policy?
For decades, criminal legal literature generally has adopted a story of mass
incarceration’s rise as caused by popular punitive impulses or “punitive
populism.”7 Rising prison populations, expanding criminal codes, and the
attendant raced and classed disparities in enforcement are the result of a set
of “pathological politics”: voters and politicians act in a vicious feedback
loop, consistently driving more criminal law and punishment.8 To be clear,
that’s an oversimplified account, and scholars disagree widely about the
details.9 But there is general agreement that something unique about U.S.
electoral politics, political culture, and/or political economy has led to the
uniquely American carceral state.10

[https://perma.cc/7L8Q-KTVZ]; José Martín, Six Ideas for a Cop-Free World, ROLLING
STONE (June 2, 2020, 2:48 AM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/policebrutality-cop-free-world-protest-199465/ [https://perma.cc/U8CH-V7DN].
6. See Anna Lvovsky, Rethinking Police Expertise, 131 YALE L.J. 475, 495 (2021)
(“The 1960s are remembered as witnessing a crisis of expertise, as a series of elite failures,
from the Vietnam War to the rise of malpractice litigation, alerted the public to the limits of
professional judgment. We are broadly witnessing a similar crisis again today.” (footnote
omitted)).
7. See generally RACHEL E LISE B ARKOW, P RISONERS OF P OLITICS: BREAKING THE
CYCLE OF M ASS INCARCERATION (2019); JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017); M ARIE GOTTSCHALK, C AUGHT: T HE P RISON
STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN P OLITICS (2015) [hereinafter GOTTSCHALK,
CAUGHT]; MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2006) [hereinafter GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE
GALLOWS]; JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); JAMES Q.
WHITMAN, H ARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL P UNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING D IVIDE BETWEEN
AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003).
8. See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001).
9. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER , THE N EW JIM CROW : MASS INCARCERATION
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (arguing that mass incarceration is a direct extension
of Jim Crow); LISA L. MILLER , THE MYTH OF MOB RULE: V IOLENT CRIME AND
DEMOCRATIC P OLITICS (2016) (arguing that voters are not punitive in a vacuum and that they
choose punitive policies when they are not offered nonpunitive options); NAOMI MURAKAWA,
THE FIRST CIVIL R IGHT: HOW LIBERALS BUILT P RISON AMERICA (2014) (tracing mass
incarceration to liberal political commitments).
10. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 8, at 507–10; Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and
Contingency, 125 HARV. L. REV. 760, 760–63 (2012) (reviewing DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR
INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLITION (2010)).
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The criminal system’s problems are political.11 But how should society
solve those political problems? Scholars often identify two general classes
of responses12: (1) technocratic approaches that seek to wrest power from
irrational, emotional, and punitive voters and politicians, replacing criminal
electoral politics with agencies, commissions, and evidence-based
decision-making;13 and (2) democratic approaches that treat U.S. criminal
policy as insufficiently democratic and seek to shift more power to “the
people.”14 Put differently, commentators often suggest that the critical
prescriptive disagreement boils down to one about expertise and its role—
should experts or nonexperts be the most powerful actors in criminal
policymaking?

11. I use “criminal system” or “criminal legal system” in the Article advisedly, given the
growing body of work that stresses that the administration of criminal law in the United States
implicates a range of local actors and institutions and hardly constitutes a single, unified
system. See, e.g., Monica Bell, Stephanie Garlock & Alexander Nabavi-Noori, Toward a
Demosprudence of Poverty, 69 DUKE L.J. 1473, 1475–76, 1476 n.7 (2020); Bernard E.
Harcourt, The Systems Fallacy: A Genealogy and Critique of Public Policy and Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 47 J. LEGAL S TUD. 419, 421 (2018); Benjamin Levin, Rethinking the Boundaries of
“Criminal Justice,” 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM . L. 619, 619–20 (2018); Sara Mayeux, The Idea of
“The Criminal Justice System,” 45 AM . J. CRIM . L. 55, 65 (2018); John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by
a Metaphor: A Deeply Problematic Account of Prison Growth, 111 MICH. L. R EV. 1087,
1089 (2013).
12. See, e.g., Rebecca Goldstein, The Politics of Decarceration, 129 YALE L.J. 446, 450
(2019); Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW . U. L. REV.
1367, 1399 (2017); Benjamin Levin, De-Democratizing Criminal Law, 39 CRIM . JUST.
ETHICS 74, 75–76 (2020) (reviewing RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS:
BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS INCARCERATION (2019)); Lauren M. Ouziel, Democracy,
Bureaucracy, and Criminal Justice Reform, 61 B.C. L. REV. 523, 534–40 (2020); Maria
Ponomarenko, Rethinking Police Rulemaking, 114 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2019); John
Rappaport, Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 711,
714 (2020); David Alan Sklansky, Populism, Pluralism, and Criminal Justice, 107 CALIF. L.
REV. 2009, 2011 (2019).
13. See generally DARRYL K. BROWN, FREE MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HOW
DEMOCRACY AND LAISSEZ F AIRE UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW (2016); Rachel E. Barkow,
Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61
STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., From “Overcriminalization” to “Smart on
Crime”: American Criminal Justice Reform—Legacy and Prospects, 7 J.L. ECON. & P OL’Y
597, 616 (2011); Nicola Lacey, Humanizing the Criminal Justice Machine: Re-Animated
Justice or Frankenstein’s Monster?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1299, 1324 (2013); Rappaport, supra
note 12.
14. See generally STEPHANOS BIBAS , THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2012);
Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405 (2018); Aliza
Plener Cover, Supermajoritarian Criminal Justice, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 875, 876 (2019);
Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613 (2019);
Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community Engagement”
Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. R EV. 793 (2016); Dorothy E.
Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project, 111 NW . U. L. REV. 1597
(2017); Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM .
L. REV. 249 (2019); Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Through
Contestation and Resistance, 111 NW . U. L. REV. 1609 (2017); Jocelyn Simonson,
Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV . 391 (2016). See also GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT, supra note
7, at 278 (arguing that a “technicist” approach to reform “is inattentive to the important
political and symbolic dimensions of crime prevention and penal policy more generally”).

2782

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

While this two-type classification can help to understand a number of
disagreements about how to bring about policy change, it paints too neat a
picture. The classificatory scheme, which sets up the two approaches as
competing, misses a point of increasing commonality: a shared appeal to the
language of experts and expertise.
In this Article, I argue that the key fault line between visions of change is
not the one between proponents and opponents of expertise. Rather,
competing camps are advancing different versions or visions of expertise and
different accounts of how those experts should exert influence in criminal
policymaking. Activists, advocates, and scholars who reject the traditional
metrics or markers of “expertise” (i.e., educational credentials, professional
experience)15 have begun to deconstruct the potential elitism and false
neutrality of expert-based decision-making.16 While some of these accounts
appear to reject expertise altogether, others have sought to reconstruct and
reimagine a new vision of expertise and a new set of experts—people from
marginalized communities who have been harmed by violence and/or the
criminal system.17 In other words, I argue that we may be witnessing a turn
to expertise that transcends other ideological, political, or methodological
divides.18
In an effort to understand better the landscape and stakes of the expert
turns, I map out three different conceptions of expertise that are reflected in
contemporary debate: (1) expertise based on vocation or on-the-job
experience (e.g., the police officer, the judge, or the criminal law
practitioner); (2) expertise based on education or elite training (e.g., the
criminologist, the law professor, or the data analyst); and (3) expertise based
on lived, day-to-day experience (e.g., the incarcerated person, the person
frequently stopped by police, or the crime victim).19
The first two conceptions have long-established positions in the study and
architecture of the criminal system. Education-based expertise as the
reformist gold standard has been a staple of good-government-style
15. See MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in THE V OCATION LECTURES 32, 44–46
(David Owen & Tracy B. Strong eds., Rodney Livingstone trans., 2004).
16. See, e.g., Priscilla Ocen, Beyond Ferguson: Integrating Critical Race Theory and the
“Social Psychology of Criminal Procedure,” in THE N EW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 226
(Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017); Mariana Valverde, “Miserology”: A
New Look at the History of Criminology, in THE NEW CRIMINAL J USTICE THINKING, supra,
at 325; Akbar, supra note 14, at 425 (arguing for a “vision to imagine expertise very
differently than law scholarship”); Monica C. Bell, Safety, Friendship, and Dreams, 54 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 703, 712 (2019); Ngozi Okidegbe, The Democratizing Potential of
Algorithms?, CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022); Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through
a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. 778 (2021) [hereinafter Simonson, Police Reform]; Jocelyn
Simonson, Power over Policing, BOS. REV. (June 8, 2020), http://bostonreview.net/lawjustice/jocelyn-simonson-power-over-policing [https://perma.cc/DM9X-3FUU] [hereinafter
Simonson, Power over Policing].
17. See infra Part IV.
18. Cf. Pierre Schlag, Expertopia—The Rule of Expertise and the Rise of the New
Technocrats 10 (Feb. 27, 2022) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that
“the rule of expertise (at least in law) is ascendant”).
19. At times, these visions or understandings may overlap.
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interventions from the left and the right.20 And appeals to (and critiques of)
vocation-based expertise not only are staples of the academic literature; they
also undergird the doctrinal framework for criminal procedure, from Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to appellate courts’ deference to sentencing
judges and prison officials.21
While the third conception has historical antecedents, it generally hasn’t
been featured in discussions of criminal justice expertise. Often the product
of abolitionist and radical approaches to the criminal system,22 the
conception, which has gained ground of late, deconstructs the
expert/nonexpert distinction relied on in most technocratic accounts and
common in the literature on criminal policy. Instead, this conception frames
expertise as the product of the lived, day-to-day experiences of people
affected by the criminal system: the resident of a heavily policed
neighborhood, incarcerated people, the victim of state or interpersonal
violence, and so forth.23 This conception of expertise resonates with a set of
moves developed in critical race theory, postcolonial theory, and other
poststructural approaches to law and knowledge production.24
In this Article, I raise a series of questions implicated by the expert turn—
whichever approach to expertise one adopts.25 I argue that the “traditional”
conceptions understate the inherent politicization of expertise. Further, the
long-standing debate in academic, activist, and policy circles about what
values the criminal system is supposed to advance makes it unclear how
experts should go about addressing contested policy questions. Additionally,
I argue that these conceptions of expertise are slipperier than they appear—
who actually gets to decide what constitutes expertise and who gets to be an
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. While this move may have a certain left, anti-carceral valence, its consequences
remain indeterminate. See infra Part IV. For example, this model of expertise also resonates
with a more punitive discourse on victims’ rights that might elevate the voices of people
harmed by crime who wish to see defendants treated more harshly. See infra note 303 and
accompanying text.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See generally DERRICK B ELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE E LUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); Michel Foucault, On Popular Justice: A Discussion with
Maoists, in P OWER /KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED I NTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972–
1977, at 1, 8, 30 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham & Kate Soper
trans., 1980); P AULO FREIRE, P EDAGOGY OF THE O PPRESSED 44–45 (Myra Bergman Ramos
trans., 2000); BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 26–27 (2015);
P ATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF R ACE AND RIGHTS 3–51 (1991); Richard Delgado,
Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. R EV. 2411
(1989); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Kimani Paul-Emile, Foreword: Critical Race Theory
and Empirical Methods Conference, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2953, 2956 (2015) (“[T]he social
sciences’ implicit claims of ‘objectivity’ and embrace of ‘neutrality’ in knowledge production
stand in contrast to CRT’s contention that these claims mask hierarchies of power that often
cleave along racial lines.”).
25. To be clear, there certainly might be other ways to map or define “expertise” in the
criminal context. See Lvovsky, supra note 6, at 481 (describing “the difference between seeing
expertise as a professional virtue or as a professional technology” when it comes to judicial
treatments of police).
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expert? Rather than eliminating politics from the administration of criminal
law, deferring to experts just shifts the location of political decisions to the
stage of defining and qualifying expertise.26
The turn to lived experience—in some sense—responds to these concerns
by highlighting the contingent, politicized, and contextual way in which
society and legal institutions interpret truth claims.27 By expanding the class
of experiences and backgrounds that qualify a person to participate in
policymaking or “official” discourse on criminal law, this deconstructive
move highlights the politicized project of selecting experts in the first place
and denaturalizes experts’ privileged status.
Therefore, in this Article, I highlight the potential of this deconstructive
move as a vehicle for reimagining the structure and terms of criminal
policymaking. A reconstructive move that might replace the existing
structure of governance by experts with a system of governance by (new)
experts, though, raises a new set of questions worth considering. A shift to
a new model of expertise might begin to address some of the existing power
imbalances and structures of elitism and exclusion, but might “expertise” as
a frame risk reifying exclusion and imbalances of power? Put differently, I
see the deconstructive move (i.e., breaking down the expert/nonexpert
distinction) as fundamentally inclusive, as more voices, particularly voices
from marginalized or less powerful communities, should be elevated in
policymaking, and those voices should be heard and evaluated alongside the
voices of traditional experts. In contrast, I see any reconstructive move as
exclusive—some set of voices would be epistemically superior to others.
How might reconstructed expertise avoid replicating the same dynamics that
necessitated deconstruction in the first place? And, what is the continued
utility of “expertise” as a frame for radical approaches to criminal legal
transformation?
Two caveats are in order before I proceed. First, “expertise” is a familiar
concept in many different areas of law and in many different corners of the
criminal system. In this Article, I primarily focus on claims about the proper
role of experts in setting criminal policy. While I draw at times from other
disciplines or other areas of law, my primary focus here is on how expertise
is conceived of in discussions of criminal legal policy. And, while I address
in passing “expertise” as it arises doctrinally in the rules of evidence or
Daubert hearings, I am less focused on such questions of technical
qualification. Many of the observations, arguments, and critiques that I trace

26. I have begun to trace these arguments in much briefer terms elsewhere. See generally
Levin, supra note 12; Benjamin Levin, Response, Values and Assumptions in Criminal
Adjudication, 129 HARV. L. R EV. F. 379 (2016).
27. Cf. Schlag, supra note 18, at 76 (“Perhaps the problem is not with expertise qua
knowledge-form, but rather with the particular genre of expertise that currently dominates in
law. . . . [T]he main problem with our experts . . . is that ours are simply way too taken with
a quest for formalization, mastery, and authoritativeness. We could say, perhaps, that an
expertise tempered with broader more general, more critical perspectives would be far more
appealing.”).
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certainly may bear on evidentiary debates.28 But, the analysis that follows
operates more on the wholesale level of policy and lawmaking across
institutions than on the retail level of individual cases and individual
evidentiary motions.
Second, in raising questions about expertise as a frame, I don’t mean to
reject out-of-hand the importance and value of “experts” of many different
models. Any decisions about criminal policymaking rest on some universe
of facts and assumptions about the nature of society (e.g., what risks are
acceptable, what harms require state intervention, and what conduct is
widespread). And, any such decision-making requires someone to supply
those facts and assumptions. In this Article, I argue that choosing who those
“someones” are and how much weight to give their input are not neutral or
apolitical decisions. Unpacking and surfacing those decisions should be an
important part of any path forward toward institutional change.29 By looking
more closely at how society understands which voices to privilege and the
extent to which those voices should shape policy, I contend that we can better
appreciate first-principles disagreements about criminal law and
governance.30
My argument unfolds in four parts. In Part I, I set up the conventional
distinction between “democratizers” and “bureaucratizers.” I argue that this
bifurcated characterization—ascendant in the literature—understates the
overlap between both visions of institutional change.
In Part II, I describe the two dominant, or traditional, visions of expertise:
(1) expertise rooted in education and (2) expertise rooted in vocational
experience. I trace the ways in which these visions of expertise have shaped
policy proposals and the existing landscape of criminal law and policy.
Further, I tie the belief in neutral experts to a certain vision of Progressive-era
and New Deal–era thought about the proper mode of governance.
In Part III, I offer a critical reading of these traditional conceptions of
expertise. First, I argue that they often rest on the faulty premise that the
criminal system has some generally agreed upon purpose, which would allow
experts to reach optimal policy solutions. Second, I argue that the turn to
28. This overlap may be particularly noteworthy in the policing context, where similar
questions of what constitutes expertise regarding policing might be relevant to larger policy
debates, as well as more discrete questions of an individual officer’s behavior or qualifications.
See generally Lvovsky, supra note 6 (tracing competing judicial approaches to police
expertise).
29. Cf. BERNARD E. H ARCOURT, LANGUAGE OF THE GUN: YOUTH, C RIME, AND P UBLIC
P OLICY xi (2006) (“Rather than use the research to draw law and policy inferences, use the
research to expose the assumptions about human behavior that . . . underlie the law and policy
proposals.”); Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication
and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM . L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 733, 735 (2000) (“[U]se of empirical evidence will produce a clearer picture
of the existing constitutional landscape and spotlight the normative judgments at the heart of
criminal procedure cases.”).
30. Cf. Aya Gruber, When Theory Met Practice: Distributional Analysis in Critical
Criminal Law Theorizing, 83 FORDHAM L. R EV. 3211, 3214 (2015) (“[C]ritical scholars must
be careful not to lionize data as objective or untouchable and to retain awareness that scientific
knowledge is necessarily produced within the context of value-driven choices.”).
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expertise generally understates the ways in which expert analysis of data is
always political. Despite attempts at insulation, elite actors will still be
embedded in a certain set of values and assumptions about how the world
should work. And, given the state of the criminal system, there’s good reason
to be skeptical that simply choosing the right experts will address deep-seated
cultural attitudes about punishment and the proper scope of criminal law.
In Part IV, I pivot to the third and least-explored conception of expertise—
expertise rooted in the lived experience of laypeople and those directly
affected by the system. I examine the ways in which this alternative turn to
expertise represents a deconstruction of the expert/nonexpert binary and
therefore should provide some hope for those who share my concerns about
expertise and its limitations, including commentators who wish to rethink the
political economy of criminal law. Ultimately, though, I raise a series of
questions implicated by this new conception of expertise—questions that I
see as critical to any path forward that continues to rely on or deploy the
language of expertise.
I. BEYOND THE BUREAUCRACY/DEMOCRACY DISTINCTION
In his Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, Professor Joshua
Kleinfeld articulates “one foundational, enormously important . . . line of
disagreement” in conversations about criminal policy:
On one side are those who think the root of the present crisis is the outsized
influence of the American public . . . and the solution is to place control
over criminal justice in the hands of officials and experts. On the other side
are those who think the root of the present crisis is a set of bureaucratic
attitudes, structures, and incentives divorced from the American public’s
concerns and sense of justice, and the solution is to make criminal justice
more community focused and responsive to lay influences.31

Kleinfeld’s framing allows for some strange bedfellows and ideological
tensions but suggests that core commitments might unite otherwise disparate
actors into two general camps.32
For example, the democratizer camp might include abolitionists who seek
to amplify the voices of anti-carceral activists alongside commentators who
are critical of or agnostic about decarceration and instead hope to see criminal
law tied more closely to public morality.33 Similarly, the bureaucratizer
camp might include commentators who would replace the current structures
of the criminal system with a more explicitly managerial model alongside
others who imagine that some sort of agency oversight would improve the
functioning of prosecutors, police, etc. But, even if commentators in each
31. Kleinfeld, supra note 12, at 1376.
32. See id.
33. Compare Akbar, supra note 14, at 460, and McLeod, supra note 14, at 1618, with
Stephanos Bibas, Improve, Dynamite, or Dissolve the Criminal Regulatory State?, in THE
NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING, supra note 16, at 61, 61–62 (“Instead of relying more
on expertise and wonkish incremental reforms or repudiating the whole exercise, I advocate a
return to criminal justice’s populist moral roots as the system’s guiding star.”).
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camp diverge on whether they desire more or less punishment, the
bureacratizer/democratizer frame suggests that there are still shared
commitments regarding process and distributions of power.
Scholars who have adopted this distinction certainly have hit on some core
conceptual, rhetorical, and practical fault lines.34 Nevertheless, I see the
distinction as relying on an underlying problematic assumption: that a clean
line exists between bureaucracy (or technocracy) and democracy35—or, even
if such a line could be drawn theoretically, that such a line actually exists
between the camps of activists, advocates, and academics.36 It hardly should
come as a surprise to see such a distinction obtaining widespread purchase—
similar distinctions between the political and the rational or technical persist
in many corners of legal thought.37
One of my core claims in this Article, though, is that the line between
technocratic or bureaucratic arguments on the one hand and democratic ones
on the other is much blurrier than it appears. By pitting technocracy and
democracy against one another, as clear and incommensurable poles and
goals, much writing about the U.S. criminal system understates both deep
political divisions and points of potential commonality. As international law
scholar Professor David Kennedy describes this relationship in the context of
global governance, “the effort to ‘replace technocracy with democracy’ . . .
leaves unexplored the assumption that they are essentially different while
shielding from controversy the process by which earlier struggles had settled
this as technical and this as political.”38 That is, just as technocracy often
assumes a class of elite actors insulated from politics, democracy (or
discussions of it) often flattens out distributions of power and claims to

34. See, e.g., Brenner M. Fissell, Local Offenses, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 844 (2020);
Simonson, Police Reform, supra note 16, at 799–803; Elizabeth G. Jánszky, Note, Defining
“Local” in a Localized Criminal Justice System, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1318, 1324–26 (2019).
35. Cf. David Owen & Tracy B. Strong, Introduction: Max Weber’s Calling to
Knowledge and Action, in THE V OCATION LECTURES, supra note 15, at ix, xiv (describing
the “positivistic conceptual separation of ‘facts’ from ‘values’”).
36. The distinction risks understating overlaps in approach. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow
& Mark Osler, Designed to Fail: The President’s Deference to the Department of Justice in
Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 59 WM . & M ARY L. REV. 387, 459 (2017) (advocating
a clemency board that incorporates “formerly incarcerated people who can speak to their
experiences while incarcerated and during reentry”); Allegra M. McLeod, Beyond the
Carceral State, 95 TEX. L. R EV. 651, 688 (2017) (expressing some optimism about
“technicist” approaches).
37. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR ., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 183 (1990) (describing administrative law as
“entail[ing] a conception of politics as distinguishable from and in opposition to the required
rationality of agency decision making”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2270 (2001) (explaining that courts “requir[e] that agency action bear
the indicia of essentially apolitical, ‘expert’ process and judgment”); Kathryn A. Watts,
Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 30
(2009) (describing the persistence of this politics/expertise distinction in administrative law).
38. DAVID K ENNEDY, A WORLD OF STRUGGLE: HOW P OWER , LAW , AND EXPERTISE
SHAPE GLOBAL P OLITICAL ECONOMY 39 (2016).

2788

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

relative authority that proliferate in even ostensibly less-hierarchical
structures of governance and decision-making.39
In addition to reckoning with the theoretical slipperiness of this distinction,
any attempt to distinguish on these grounds must consider the ways in which
bureaucratizers rely on a democratic logic and democratizers appear to rely
on a technocratic logic. Framed differently, “[c]riticism of the ‘technocratic’
nature of . . . decision making” may operate “simply [as] a way of arguing
that the wrong interests and ideologies and technical arguments have won
out.”40 Technocratic scholarship and policy proposals frequently incorporate
some acknowledgement of democratic needs and inputs. For example,
maybe as some have suggested, administrative oversight of policing should
be combined with a sort of “notice and comment” process to allow input from
community members.41 That is, some proponents of technocratic institutions
appear to frame their arguments as advancing democracy via administrative
governance.42 Or, even if democratic inputs aren’t framed as desirable, many
pro-technocracy commentators appear to embrace “expert decisionmaking”
as a means of achieving some distance from electoral politics.43 And, as I
argue in Part III, even these more sophisticated calls for technocratic
solutions may understate how much technocracy or bureaucracy remains
embedded in politics. Moreover, proponents of greater democracy continue
to argue for a conception of expertise that advances democratic ends or shifts
power to previously subordinated groups.44 And, many proponents of greater
public involvement frame that involvement as complementary to—not a
replacement for—governance by experts, insiders, or professionals.45
All of this is to say that the real question is less whether experts have a role
to play and more who those experts are and what they are expected to do.46
Therefore, in this Article, I ask who the imagined experts are for different
ideological, political, and intellectual projects. When scholars or activists
39. See id.
40. Id. at 3 (footnote omitted).
41. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1827, 1834 (2015); Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. P A. L.
REV. 91, 137 (2016).
42. See infra notes 101–04 and accompanying text.
43. There may be good reason to worry whether such institutions actually can reflect the
will of marginalized communities. See Monica C. Bell, The Community in Criminal Justice:
Subordination, Consumption, Resistance, and Transformation, 16 DU BOIS R EV. 197, 209
(2019).
44. See infra Part IV.A.
45. See, e.g., BIBAS, supra note 14, at xviii (“That does not mean that we should or even
can abolish . . . lawyers’ leading role in criminal justice . . . . But . . . [we should] giv[e]
outsiders more information, more voice, and more influence . . . . Instead of remaining
outsiders, victims, defendants, and ordinary citizens should actively participate as
stakeholders alongside insiders.”); Bell, supra note 16, at 712.
46. Cf. Lvovsky, supra note 6, at 540–41 (“In scholarly debates, expertise increasingly
figures as a site of struggle, a deeply politicized and contested bid for power. But in ordinary
parlance, it generally retains a less complicated association: it is, in effect, a compliment.
Inside and outside the legal academy, designations of expertise often function as status
markers, hallmarks of value and authority in a technocratic culture that prizes relative
competency.” (footnotes omitted)).
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call for “experts,” describe actors as “experts,” or critique “experts” and their
qualifications, what do they mean? Who are the experts they imagine, and
what qualifies them as such? Once experts are certified, qualified, or
recognized, what power does the title of “expert” entitle them to?
Perhaps, I suggest, we might reframe the bureaucratizer/democratizer
distinction by focusing on competing visions of expertise that reflect
different visions of governance, distribution, and public participation.
Maybe “bureaucratizer” operates as a shorthand for the turn to elite actors or
actors whose qualifications are drawn from dominant institutions in the
criminal system.47 And perhaps “democratizer” operates as a shorthand for
the turn to actors generally disempowered by the current hierarchies and
logics of the criminal system.48
That method of characterizing the distinction or the competing frames may
provide greater detail and clarity. But, it still has shortcomings. First, it
assumes that there is a clear distinction between those two sets of actors. As
I argue below, too much discussion of expertise in the context of criminal
law and policy fails to state explicitly what makes an expert or how narrowly
cabined (or capacious) concepts of expertise should be. Second, even once
we identify what makes an expert an expert—a primary objective of this
Article—we are left with follow-up questions: What does or should an expert
get to do? Is the expert the decider or arbiter who should be handed the reins
of the criminal system? Is the expert the privileged advisor whose opinion
should be credited by the politician or final decider?49 Or, is the expert
someone who is deserving of a “seat at the table”—just another voice, but
one that has been recognized as legitimate within the confines of official
policy discourse and decision-making?50
These are difficult questions, and the literature on criminal justice reform
and transformation hardly reflects consistent answers.51 In this Article, I try
to surface those questions and the ways in which the answers may point in
dramatically different directions as we consider whether and how the face of
the criminal system will change. Further, I hope to stress the ways in which
any turn to expertise is embedded in a certain distribution of political and
institutional power. Different visions of expertise might reflect different
understandings or models of politics, knowledge, and their relationship to
one another. But, any turn to expertise requires addressing the costs and
benefits of shifting the locus of political debate and contestation to the space

47. Cf. BIBAS, supra note 14, at 29–34 (distinguishing between criminal law “insiders”
and “outsiders”).
48. Such a frame may resonate with calls to focus on power-shifting as the lens through
which to view debates about institutional transformation. See generally K. Sabeel Rahman &
Jocelyn Simonson, The Institutional Design of Community Control, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 679
(2020); Simonson, Police Reform, supra note 16.
49. See infra Part IV.B.3.
50. See generally Trevor George Gardner, By Any Means: A Philosophical Frame for
Rulemaking Reform in Criminal Law, 130 YALE L.J.F. 798 (2021).
51. See infra Part IV.B.3.
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of expert knowledge.52 In the next part, I begin that examination by tracing
out the traditional conceptions of expertise and how they operate—and are
imagined as operating—to structure decision-making about criminal law and
its administration.
II. TRADITIONAL MODELS OF EXPERTISE
Law, or at least U.S. legal culture, stands as a space dominated by
experts.53 Legal argument, legal texts, legal practice, and legal scholarship
are notoriously hostile to outsiders and interlopers.54 Whether that
“expertise” is understood in terms of mastery of doctrine, jargon, and formal
thought, or (through more of a realist lens) as knowing how the law works
on the ground, legal practice and the legal academy operate on the
assumption that law requires a specialized understanding.55 Indeed, even
within the already-elite and inhospitable realms of legal practice and legal
scholarship,
siloing
among
various
specialties
allows
for
hyperspecialization.56
In the spaces of criminal law and its administration, expertise has played a
special function—from police officers and detectives, to prosecutors and
judges, to probation officers, prison officials, and parole boards, the criminal
system is neck-deep in competing claims to expertise. In this part, I address
the two traditional conceptions of expertise that recur in legal scholarship,
lawmaking, and policy discussions. First, I identify the conception that has
long held sway in courts: a belief in expertise accumulated through
52. See Schlag, supra note 18, at 71 (“[E]xpertise has but one move, or one tendency: to
reduce everything to the order of expert knowledge.”).
53. See Lvovsky, supra note 6, at 542 (“[L]awyers and judges identify as members of
their own highly skilled and credentialed expert group, a designation that many regard as
central to their own effective performance and that (conveniently) entitles them to significant
social and professional privilege. Enjoying what they see as the fruits of their own
technocratic authority, they may simply be likelier to regard expertise as a distinction worth
respecting.” (footnotes omitted)).
54. See generally DUNCAN K ENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
HIERARCHY: A P OLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983) (describing law school and legal
reasoning as designed to reproduce hierarchies and stifle radicalism); Akbar, supra note 14
(describing the limited imagination of formal law and legal discourse); Marc Galanter, Why
the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC ’Y
REV. 95 (1974).
55. To the extent that “legal expertise” is bounded, legal thinkers often suggest it is
because experts in other fields retain some epistemic advantage when questions implicate their
jurisdiction. See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL
SOCIAL SCIENCE 77, 79 (1995).
56. On the siloing of legal scholarship and the legal academy, see, for example, Richard
Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 165 (2007) (critiquing the distinction among labor law, employment
law, and employment discrimination as a formalist mischaracterization of “work law”); Janet
Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 1, 5 (2011)
(critiquing the move to exceptionalize “family law”); Veronica Root Martinez, Investigating
Intersections of Corporate Governance & Compliance, U. CHI. L. R EV. ONLINE (Jan. 7,
2020),
https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/01/07/investigating-intersections-ofcorporate-governance-compliance-by-veronica-root-martinez/ [] (describing the “intellectual
silos that are so often found within legal scholarship”).
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on-the-job training and experience.57 Second, I identify the strand of
expertise frequently identified as underpinning the turn to technocracy—a
belief that educational training can allow for more effective administration
of criminal law.58
A. Vocational Expertise
Visit any criminal court room in the country, and you’re sure to see the
power of vocational expertise in action. The administration of criminal law
rests on nested systems of deference to actors whose past experience is
treated as expertise.59 As Professor William Stuntz observed, “criminal law
is . . . not law at all, but a veil that hides a system that allocates criminal
punishment discretionarily.”60 And, in understanding the scope of vocational
expertise, it is important to recognize that the “experts” might possess
different degrees of training, might occupy different social statuses, or might
fall in different places within the internal hierarchy of the criminal system.61
1. Vocational Expertise in Action62
For example, consider the sentencing process. As I will discuss in the next
section, educational expertise certainly has taken on a major role in the
57. Cf. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM . ECON. REV. 519,
521–22 (1945) (describing “local” knowledge).
58. As I will discuss at much greater length in Part III, the question remains how we can,
or should, go about assessing “effectiveness.”
59. This model of expertise might find purchase with the Weberian concept of “traditional
authority.” See M AX WEBER , E CONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY 215 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978) (arguing that such authority
“rest[s] on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of
those exercising authority under them”).
60. Stuntz, supra note 8, at 599. While I agree with Stuntz’s characterization of criminal
law and its administration, I part ways on one key point: it is not clear to me that criminal law
is unique; from a realist perspective, all legal institutions share the feature that Stuntz
identifies. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 5 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008)
(1930) (“What these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself.”); Pauline T.
Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 412 (2007); Issa Kohler-Hausmann,
Jumping Bunnies and Legal Rules: The Organizational Sociologist and the Legal Scholar
Should Be Friends, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING, supra note 16, at 246, 257
(“Laws don’t apply themselves; someone somewhere must do things and make choices.”).
This observation falls well outside the scope of this Article, but it is worth noting as a means
of appreciating just how high the stakes are for the debates about expertise described here.
Deciding who counts as an expert and who is deserving of deference are not just questions for
administrative law and criminal law; they are questions that are essential to any institutional
analysis of law.
61. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 60, at 5 (“[T]he people who have the doing in charge,
whether they be judges or sheriffs or clerks or jailers or lawyers, are officials of the law.”).
62. Each of the examples in this section reflects a focus on courts and the ways in which
expertise and deference play out in the judicial context. To be clear, though, these are simply
examples. By focusing on judges, I do not mean to understate the ways in which criminal
policymaking occurs in other places. My suggestion is that similar patterns of deference based
on expertise play out in nonjudicial contexts. For example, scholars have shown that
legislators regularly defer to prosecutors and law enforcement in drafting criminal statutes.
See, e.g., KATHERINE B ECKETT, MAKING CRIME P AY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
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sentencing process. But, even in a world of sentencing commissions,
predictive algorithms, and so forth, sentencing still involves a heavy reliance
on the gut intuitions of actors based on their past experiences on the job.
The decision-making process rests on a hierarchy of deference or a set of
nested deferrals to expert actors.63 The appellate judge generally defers to
the trial court judge on the assumption that the trial court judge has some
expertise over matters of sentencing; presumably, the trial court judge has
sentenced many defendants in the past and so is able to assess the “proper”
punishment—perhaps being able to determine the defendant’s relative
culpability as compared to past defendants and make judgments about how
best to serve the purposes of punishment based on impressions of previous
defendants.64 As former U.S. District Judge Nancy Gertner describes the
process, “The judge [is] seen as an ‘expert’ in individualizing the sentence to
reflect the goals of punishment, including rehabilitation and deterrence.”65
Additionally, after actually having sat through the sentencing hearing, seen
the defendant firsthand, and heard from witnesses, perhaps the trial court
judge is better positioned than the appellate court judge to make the sort of
hyperpersonalized assessments of an individual that sentencing often
entails.66
The sentencing judge, though, may similarly defer to the expertise of the
vocational experts before her: probation department representatives who
may make recommendations based on their department’s work with the
individual defendant or past defendants, and the prosecutor who may base

AMERICAN P OLITICS 98–101 (1997); Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization,
86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 232 n.31 (2007). When prosecutors argue that they need broad criminal
statutes to address certain problems or obtain convictions against certain defendants,
legislators oblige. See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102
COLUM . L. REV. 2162, 2194 (2002); Shon Hopwood, Clarity in Criminal Law, 54 AM . CRIM .
L. REV. 695, 736 (2017). It’s a stretch to conclude that prosecutors are such effective lobbyists
because they represent a massive voting bloc. Rather, at least some of this deference may be
explained in terms of expertise: legislators lack knowledge about the mine run of cases and
the inner workings of the criminal system. When prosecutors make a claim about what tools
are necessary to reach a pressing problem, they can frame that argument in terms of their
superior knowledge based on their on-the-job experience.
63. This description owes a debt to Michel Foucault’s characterization of “subsidiary
authorities” and “[s]mall-scale legal systems” that predominate throughout “penal procedure.”
See MICHEL FOUCAULT , DISCIPLINE & P UNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE P RISON 21 (Alan
Sheridan trans., 2d ed. 1995).
64. Nancy Gertner, What Has Harris Wrought, 15 FED. SENT’G R EP. 83, 84 (2002); see
also Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 389 (2006); John
F. Stanton, Avoiding and Appealing Excessive Sentences, 40 LITIG. 46, 50 (2014) (“[T]he
sentencing judge has more expertise in administering sentences and has the opportunity to
observe the defendant and other trial participants firsthand.”).
65. Nancy Gertner, Sentencing Reform: When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57 ME. L. R EV.
569, 571 (2005).
66. See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996) (noting the trial court judge’s
“day-to-day experience in criminal sentencing”); Paul J. Hofer, Beyond the “Heartland”:
Sentencing Under the Advisory Federal Guidelines, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 675, 691 (2011) (“The
sentencing judge . . . has the advantages of knowing the particular facts of the case and the
individual characteristics of the defendant better than any rule-maker in Washington, D.C.”).
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recommendations on similar encounters with other defendants.67 In turn, the
prosecutor might defer to the probation department (believing that the
department possesses specific expertise about determining the right sort of
punishment) or to senior prosecutors who have developed greater insight into
sentencing based on their handling of large numbers of cases.
Sentencing provides only one such example. Judicial oversight of police
operates along similar lines.68 “Expertise” and appeals to expertise undergird
the architecture of modern policing, justifying sweeping deference from
judges and lawmakers.69 For example, in Terry v. Ohio,70 the seminal
decision upholding the constitutionality of stop-and-frisks without probable
cause, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly based its analysis on a vocational
model of expertise.71 The Court concluded that Cleveland Police Detective
Martin McFadden’s decision to stop and search the defendants was justified
not by a “hunch” (which would have been unconstitutional), but by “specific
reasonable inferences which he [was] entitled to draw from the facts in light
of his experience.”72 The Court also repeatedly framed McFadden’s
experience as significant in providing his special understanding of an
individual’s possible criminality.73
Terry was hardly an outlier.74 The decades following Terry have seen
judges and legislators frequently defer to an imagined police expertise,
rooted perhaps less in specific training than in the instincts picked up on the
job—instincts that might allow an officer to distinguish a guilty defendant
from a random person on the street, or to determine when a civilian was a
proper target of force.75 Outside of the suppression context, the presence of
67. See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. C ABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE F EDERAL C OURTS 20–22 (1998); Anupam Chander, Designating the
Place of Confinement in Probation Sentences: A Judge’s Prerogative, 8 FED. SENT’G REP.
173, 174 (1995).
68. As Professor Anna Lvovsky has described at length, expertise has played a critical
role in both expanding and constraining police power. See generally Lvovsky, supra note 6.
69. See generally Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130
HARV. L. REV. 1995 (2017); Josh Segal, Note, “All of the Mysticism of Police Expertise”:
Legalizing Stop-and-Frisk in New York, 1961–1968, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. R EV. 573 (2012).
70. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
71. See id. at 8, 20–22, 24; see also Elizabeth E. Joh, The Consequences of Automating
and Deskilling the Police, 67 UCLA L. R EV. DISCOURSE 133, 150 (2019) (“[T]he Court
grounded its decision in terms of police expertise.”).
72. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 30 (“[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot . . . he is
entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search.”).
74. See Lvovsky, supra note 69, at 1998–99 (“[J]udges came to rely on the promise of
police expertise—the notion that trained, experienced officers develop rarefied and reliable
insight into crime—to expand police authority in multiple areas of the law.”).
75. See, e.g., Joh, supra note 71, at 150; Lvovsky, supra note 69, at 1998–99; Anthony
O’Rourke, Structural Overdelegation in Criminal Procedure, 103 J. CRIM . L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 407, 429 n.79 (2013) (“[P]olice officers receive an extremely high level of
deference about their determinations . . . as long as they are prepared to invoke their
‘experience and expertise’ as the basis of their decision.” (quoting Ornelas v. United States,
517 U.S. 690, 699–700 (1996))).
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“police practices experts”—essentially, former officers who testify about
proper police conduct—in use-of-force cases helps to suggest that the
“mysticism of police expertise”76 requires a sort of specialized knowledge
that only other officers possess.77 Or, as the Supreme Court put it in Ornelas
v. United States,78 judges’ deference to officers’ decision-making is justified
because “a police officer views the facts through the lens of his police
experience and expertise.”79
Like policing and sentencing, prison administration reveals the
explanatory power of vocational expertise as a frame.80 The architecture of
prison law similarly relies largely on judges’ deference to the expertise of
prison officials.81 Efforts by incarcerated people to challenge the conditions
of their confinement are rarely met with success.82 These failures may be
explained by a range of factors, from a lack of legal representation to general
political hostility, but perhaps the greatest obstacle is the trust that elite legal
actors have placed in the expertise of those who work in corrections.83 The
doctrinal framework of “prison law” is one rooted in discretion, deference,
and a set of assumptions about the expertise of correctional officers and
prison administrators.84
Guards, wardens, and others in the “corrections industry” have a great deal
of power to shape the experience of incarceration for people inside, and
lawmakers and judges are consistently loath to circumscribe that power.85 In
1995, Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act,86 which nods to

76. See generally Segal, supra note 69.
77. See David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the
Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 301 (“[T]he Court in effect declared that police
officers should receive as much deference as trial judges.”). See generally Seth W. Stoughton,
Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847 (2014) (arguing that appellate courts tend to defer to
officers but often base that deference on a misunderstanding of what policing looks like in
practice).
78. 517 U.S. 690 (1996).
79. Id. at 699.
80. See generally Lisa Kerr, Contesting Expertise in Prison Law, 60 MC GILL L.J. 43
(2014).
81. See generally Keramet Reiter, Supermax Administration and the Eighth Amendment:
Deference, Discretion, and Double Bunking, 1986–2010, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 89 (2015).
See also Keramet Reiter & Kelsie Chesnut, Correctional Autonomy and Authority in the Rise
of Mass Incarceration, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC . SCI. 49, 58 (2018) (describing the discretion
afforded to prison officials).
82. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1590–91 (2003).
83. See Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209–10 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“[T]he public . . . assumed lawyers and judges were engaged in a careful assessment of
correctional policies, while most lawyers and judges assumed these matters were for the
policymakers and correctional experts.”).
84. See generally Sharon Dolovich, Forms of Deference in Prison Law, 24 FED. SENT’G
REP. 245 (2012).
85. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547–48 (1979); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
826–27 (1974); Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 881 (2009); Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55
DUKE L.J. 437, 449 (2005).
86. Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to -77 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
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correctional officials’ expertise and makes it harder for federal judges in civil
rights suits to “micromanage” those officials.87 The Supreme Court has acted
as a willing partner in this shift of power, announcing that “[m]aintaining
safety and order at these institutions requires the expertise of correctional
officials, who must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions
to the problems they face.”88
2. Vocational Expertise as Reformist Model
Much academic commentary is less than enthusiastic about the value of
vocational expertise and the structures of deference discussed above. A
significant body of literature sharply criticizes appellate judges’ and
legislators’ deference to the purported expertise of prison officials and police
officers.89 And, while technocratic reform projects often include space for
the voices of actors with vocational expertise, the vocational experts are not
framed as enjoying a major epistemic advantage in questions of criminal
policy. Put differently, police, correctional officers, and other vocational
experts are not necessarily treated as experts in many reformist or
transformative takes on criminal policy.
To the extent that there are departures from this general theme, they tend
to involve more elite forms of vocational expertise. That is, some
commentators embrace the expertise of judges and attorneys in the criminal
system.90 For example, Professor Andrew Crespo has pushed back on calls
for administrative agency–like approaches to criminal adjudication,91
arguing instead that judges and other “criminal court” actors possess the
requisite expertise to address institutional flaws: “[A] criminal court has the
capacity as an institution to attain . . . the very informational breadth of
knowledge and expertise that contemporary scholars crave in the
administrative form—without sacrificing the unique institutional advantages
of the judicial process.”92 That call, in some ways, resonates with the turn to
“progressive prosecution” and the attendant faith that actors and institutions
within the criminal system can repurpose their experiences and insider

87. See 141 CONG. REC. 26,549 (1995) (statement of Sen. Bob Dole) (describing the need
to “restrain liberal Federal judges who . . . micromanage State and local prison systems”); id.
at 26,553 (1995) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“I believe that the courts have gone too far
in micromanaging our Nation’s prisons.”).
88. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 326
(2012).
89. See, e.g., David Jaros, Criminal Doctrines of Faith, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2203, 2206
(2018); Lvovsky, supra note 69, at 1997–98 (“[J]udicial deference to police judgment in
criminal procedure has inspired a small library of criticism.”); L. Song Richardson, Cognitive
Bias, Police Character, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 ARIZ. ST . L.J. 267, 287–88 (2012).
See generally Dolovich, supra note 84.
90. See generally Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional
Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049 (2016); Matthew Clair, Getting
Judges on the Side of Abolition, BOS. REV. (July 1, 2020), https://bostonreview.net/lawjustice/matthew-clair-getting-judges-side-abolition [https://perma.cc/5YWX-GSSF].
91. For a discussion of this approach, see infra Part II.B.
92. Crespo, supra note 90, at 2069 (emphasis omitted).
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knowledge to reform the system and alter its priorities.93 But Crespo is not
alone in seeing trial-court judges as enjoying some expert advantage
conferred by their time on the bench, rather than (or in addition to) their law
degrees. Indeed, that view of trial court judges is a driver of much of the
deference discussed above in the sentencing context and in other areas where
appellate judges defer to trial judges for their expertise in “managing their
courtrooms.”94
And the reliance on judicial expertise in the context of “problem-solving
courts” might reflect—at least in part—a view that judicial experience might
contribute to some expertise in assessing character or helping to design
individualized responses to lawbreaking.95 A cause embraced by advocates
and academics across the political spectrum,96 these specialty courts offer a
shift away from the traditional adversarial model,97 with judges taking on a
much larger role.98 As Professor Erin Collins describes the dynamic, “[T]he
problem-solving court judge’s expertise and authority are central to creating
and sustaining the jurisdictional space the courts occupy.”99 That is, the
problem-solving court adopts an expert frame, but does so by doubling down
on the claims of institutional competence that undergird “traditional”
criminal courts. Judges, in this account, are not just rulers of their own
93. See generally EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM
AMERICAN P ROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION (2019); Angela J. Davis,
Reimagining Prosecution: A Growing Progressive Movement, 3 UCLA CRIM . JUST. L. R EV.
1 (2019); Benjamin Levin, Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1415
(2021); David Alan Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. ONLINE 25 (2017).
94. See, e.g., supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text; see also Ornelas v. United States,
517 U.S. 690, 701 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing “expertise of the district court”
as a justification for “deferential review”); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 480
(1996) (highlighting the trial court judge’s experience in the state and federal system as
justifying deference); Paul H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions:
Matching the Decisionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM . L. REV. 1124, 1160 (2005)
(“Such discretion . . . is well informed by the special circumstances of each case and the
available punishment options, which only the sentencing judge with her local knowledge and
expertise is likely to fully understand.”).
95. Problem-solving court judges are “often deemed [experts] on the intricacies and best
practices for that model and will regularly travel the country and even the world reflecting on
their experiences and encouraging other jurisdictions to adopt their court model.” Erin R.
Collins, The Problem of Problem-Solving Courts, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1573, 1600–01
(2021).
96. See, e.g., Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. R EV. 189, 208
(2013).
97. That said, commentators broadly agree that traditional criminal courts hardly represent
an adversarial model. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass
Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 624 (2014) (“There is near consensus that felony
courts, and in particular federal felony courts, do not operate according to ‘the idealized model
of adversary justice described in the textbooks.’” (quoting Gerard E. Lynch, Our
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. R EV. 2117 (1998))). See
generally Lynch, supra.
98. See, e.g., Eaglin, supra note 96, at 209 (“A traditionally nonadversarial model, drug
courts require the prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge to agree that diversion will promote
public safety and rehabilitation.”).
99. Collins, supra note 95, at 1616.
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private fiefdoms because of politics; they now exercise control over
defendants because of their acquired expertise in handling a specific type of
case or dealing with a specific type of defendant.100 Vocational expertise,
then, can be seen as a way of explaining or legitimating the existing dynamics
in criminal courtrooms and within the criminal system.
Relatedly, some scholars have advocated for administrative solutions to
police oversight that sound in the language of vocational expertise. Dubbed
“new administrativists,” these scholars have argued that police departments
should be treated as agencies and should be governed and regulated
according to administrative law principles.101 As Professor Christopher
Slobogin argues,
Police . . . possess expertise about the various ways the criminal law . . .
can be enforced that legislatures (and courts) usually do not have. Police
agencies are much better positioned to make decisions about resource
allocation and the relative efficacy of enforcement methods than are other
institutions.102

In this account, the problem isn’t that police have power or even that police
receive significant judicial discretion. Rather, the worry is that deference is
unconstrained and doesn’t reflect any checks or commitment to democratic
process. Slobogin, for example, argues that the “exercise of . . . expertise
should be mediated through administrative law.”103 That is, police are
experts, but they should be forced to make policies via a framework that
provides checks on their expert opinions. To this end, scholars have
proposed notice-and-comment review and a host of other processes that
borrow from administrative law but still leave police as the relevant “experts”
on policing.104
B. Educational Expertise
At the outset, there may be a certain artificiality to the distinction between
“vocational” and “educational” foundations of expertise. What is vocational
training if not a form of education? The easy response sounds in a potentially
elitist register—official markers of education reflect a superior level of
understanding and expertise than on-the-job experience can afford.105 This
100. See Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting
Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1591 (2012). See generally Eric J. Miller, Embracing
Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial Interventionism, 65 OHIO S T. L.J.
1479 (2004).
101. See, e.g., Crespo, supra note 90, at 2059.
102. Slobogin, supra note 41, at 121.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 41, at 1834.
105. See STEVEN BRINT, I N AN AGE OF EXPERTS: THE C HANGING ROLE OF
P ROFESSIONALS IN P OLITICS AND P UBLIC LIFE 4 (1994) (framing relative expertise in terms
of class and relative social privilege); B ARBARA E HRENREICH, FEAR OF F ALLING: THE INNER
LIFE OF THE MIDDLE C LASS 4 (1989) (same); Clifford I. Nass, Bureaucracy, Technical
Expertise, and Professionals: A Weberian Approach, 4 SOCIO. THEORY 61, 61 (1986) (“[A]
professional is characterized by technical training and expertise, a service orientation based
on a code of ethics, and institutionalized credentials. Therefore, professionals are basically
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preference for one form of expertise over another might also reflect a certain
managerial bias when it comes to distributions of labor—managers, not
line-level workers, are seen (particularly by managerial class observers) as
possessing superior knowledge and should be entrusted with greater
policymaking authority.106 These responses may explain the turn to
educational expertise, but I don’t think they capture the core set of arguments
that drive technocratic thinking.
In many ways, the turn to educational expertise stands as the response to a
system steeped in vocational expertise.107 For commentators outraged by the
“irrationality” of criminal policy, the prevalence of junk science and folk
wisdom, and the popularity of counterproductive approaches, vocational
expertise has been a resounding failure. A common response over the past
couple of decades has been to stress the questionable nature of vocational
expertise.108 In this telling, mass incarceration and the excesses of the
criminal system are not only the result of “punitive populism” on the part of
voters and elected officials; they also result from the false claims to expertise
mobilized by police, correctional officials, and other criminal justice
actors.109 Vocational expertise presumes that the accepted or dominant
modes of policing, sentencing, and punishment are the right ones, further
entrenching flawed, punitive practices that might be deeply infected with
bias.110
Educational expertise, by contrast, might invite a critical approach.111 An
outsider’s perspective grounded in an academic or scientific method might
help to distinguish the “is” from the “ought” and allow for conversations
about what the dominant modes of policing, sentencing, and punishment
should look like.112
Educational expertise and some form of
professionalization, therefore, suggest “the ability to make authoritative
judgments and to solve problems based on disciplinary training.”113 Or, to
different than bureaucrats, individuals who simply hold a bureaucratic office.” (internal
citations omitted)).
106. See generally ÉMILE D URKHEIM , THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 43–44 (W.D.
Halls trans., Free Press 2014) (1893). This argument is reflected in at least some of the
critiques of police unions. See Benjamin Levin, What’s Wrong with Police Unions?, 120
COLUM . L. REV. 1333 (2020) (describing this preference for management over labor).
107. This distinction also might resonate with distinctions in organizational sociology and
elsewhere between “bureaucrats” and “professionals.” See Nass, supra note 105, at 64–65.
108. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Upside and Downside of Police Hunches and
Expertise, 4 J.L. ECON. & P OL’ Y 115, 119 (2007) (arguing that police “hunches,” even if
based on experience, are unreliable and problematic); Deborah L. Rhode, Character in
Criminal Justice Proceedings: Rethinking Its Role in Rules Governing Evidence, Punishment,
Prosecutors, and Parole, 45 AM . J. CRIM . L. 353, 396 (2019) (critiquing reliance by judges
and prosecutors on the “misleading folk wisdom on repentance”).
109. See, e.g., Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 CALIF. L.
REV. 1781, 1806 (2020); Levin, supra note 26, at 385–86.
110. Cf. AMITAI ETZIONI, MODERN ORGANIZATIONS 77 (1964) (discussing how
professionals justify their actions).
111. See Nass, supra note 105, at 61.
112. Cf. DURKHEIM , supra note 106, at 43–44 (distinguishing “science proper” from
“science” known by non-elite actors).
113. BRINT, supra note 105, at 40.
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borrow from Max Weber’s characterization, “The only difference between
an amateur and an expert is . . . that the amateur lacks a tried and tested
method of working. He is therefore mainly not in a position to judge or
evaluate or pursue the implications of his inspiration.”114 And, the realm of
educational expertise is almost definitionally bounded—the expert’s status
as expert relies upon a claim to specific knowledge in a specific realm that
outsiders or non-experts cannot access or cannot have mastered.115
To proponents of educational expertise, the defect in the structures of
deference in criminal law’s administration is not the deference itself, but the
basis for that deference. Mass incarceration and the punitive violence and
inequities of the system reflect ingrained bad practices that have been
replicated to the point of becoming conventional wisdom and standard
operating procedure.116 In a sense, this view reflects a recognition of the
circularity described in the previous section: the performance of the job in
the generally accepted way had been treated (by judges, legislators, and other
powerful institutional actors) as a marker of expertise and the basis for
deference and for claims of expert authority.117
While the turn to educational expertise isn’t always couched in terms of an
analogy to administrative law, it often is. To the extent that the criminal
system operates as an administrative system (or is more managerial than
adversarial),118 commentators have argued that it makes sense to advance
administrative best practices and to ensure that the “agency” is functioning
as well as possible.119 To advance these ends, they argue, it makes sense that
the agency should be subject to expert oversight.

114. MAX WEBER, Science as a Vocation, in THE V OCATION LECTURES , supra note 15, at
1, 8–9 (footnote omitted).
115. See Nass, supra note 105, at 63 (“Professional credentials . . . legitimately confirm the
technical expertise and service orientation of the certified individual as well as specify
implicitly a sphere of competence . . . . Thus, professional credentials can serve as a basis for
legitimate domination (authority).”); Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Analogy,
Expertise, and Experience, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 262 (2017) (“[T]he expertise of experts
tends to be limited to their domain of detailed knowledge.”).
116. See Rachel Herzing, Commentary, “Tweaking Armageddon”: The Potential and
Limits of Conditions of Confinement Campaigns, 41 SOC . JUST. 190, 194 (2014) (“Far from
being broken . . . the prison-industrial complex is actually efficient at fulfilling its designed
objectives—to control, cage, and disappear specific segments of the population.”); Alec
Karakatsanis, The Punishment Bureaucracy: How to Think About “Criminal Justice Reform,”
128 YALE L.J.F. 848, 851–52 (2019).
117. This understanding finds purchase in the judicial presumption of regularity. See, e.g.,
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); Cynthia Barmore, Authoritarian
Pretext and the Fourth Amendment, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 273, 313 (2016).
118. See generally Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 97; Lynch, supra note 97.
119. See generally Rachel Barkow, The Criminal Regulatory State, in THE NEW CRIMINAL
JUSTICE THINKING, supra note 16, at 33. See also Malcolm M. Feeley, How to Think About
Criminal Court Reform, 98 B.U. L. REV. 673, 707–26 (2018); cf. Emily Hammond Meazell,
Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of Agency
Science, 109 MICH. L. R EV. 733, 744 (2011) (“Certainly, our institutions ought to do their
best to incorporate good science into decision making . . . .”).
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This conception of expertise resonates with an understanding of agency
functioning associated with the rise of the administrative state during the
New Deal era:
The expertise model of the administrative state . . . attempted to eliminate
political influence by characterizing the issues that came before agencies
as non-political. To do so, the model assumed that seemingly value-laden
decisions were not controversial if viewed from the perspective of the
professionals on agency staffs who made these decisions. Essentially, the
model viewed agencies as politically disinterested entities comprised of
professionals whose decisions are driven by their professional knowledge
and training. . . . [P]olitical influence in agency decision-making was seen
as corrupting and biased when brought to bear on what were essentially
professional questions about what needed to be done to cure the relevant ill
that the agency was authorized to address.120

Viewed through this frame, “bureaucratic discretion” was hardly a thing to
be feared; rather, it was desirable “because . . . the managers and employees
who exercised it . . . [were] ‘experts’ whose professionalism simultaneously
limited the scope of their power, prevented personal domination, and made
possible the creativity and flexibility necessary to the effectiveness of the
bureaucratic form.”121
Understood in this way, educational expertise operates as a response to the
vocational model and to the electoral basis of much criminal policymaking.
Commentators have advocated for the increased use of, and emphasis on,
highly educated experts in a range of areas, from sentencing to police
oversight.122 In this section, I don’t purport to offer an exhaustive, or even
vaguely comprehensive, account of each of these areas or of the wealth of
proposals that call for the increased involvement of educated experts in
policymaking. Instead, I offer a few examples as a means of demonstrating
how educational expertise has been seen as responding to pathologies of the
criminal system.
Sentencing operates as the area perhaps most dominated by the turn to
educational expertise. Where traditional, indeterminate sentencing rested on
the discretion of trial court judges and their (vocational) expertise in
assessing the character and culpability of individual defendants,123 the turn
to sentencing guidelines and sentencing commissions reflects a belief that
educated experts can move past hunches and instinct to craft rules,
procedures, and directives that will lead to more just and appropriate
sentences.124 Put differently, many of the abuses of indeterminate sentencing

120. Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 151–52 (2012); see also Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics:
The Transformation of American Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 753 (1996).
121. Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1276, 1283 (1984).
122. See, e.g., BARKOW, supra note 7, at 165–69.
123. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
124. See Judge Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and
Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM . L. 523, 529 (2007).

2022]

CRIMINAL JUSTICE EXPERTISE

2801

were associated with its irrationality: unconstrained by traditional rules of
evidence or procedural checks associated with trial, the judge was allowed to
make personal assessments of the defendant, the defendant’s character, and
the defendant’s culpability.125 Such an idiosyncratic and individualized
assessment invited bias (e.g., perhaps the Black defendant seemed less
remorseful than the white one),126 or at least dramatic disparities from judge
to judge or from defendant to defendant (e.g., defendants with fairly similar
convictions might receive very different sentences depending on which judge
they drew or even which day they drew the same judge).127
Guidelines sentencing, then, reflected an expert turn that rejected an
earlier, vocational model of expertise. Rather than deferring to the
sentencing judge as the wise elder—the arbiter of, or stand-in for, community
values128—this new model suggested that rationality was the key.129 By
bringing in the educated experts and forming a commission, the state could
rid itself of the abuses of indeterminacy.130 Use of the guidelines could
optimize punishment, ensuring that each defendant got the punishment that
each deserved (if not in moral or retributive terms, then in the language of
good-government liberalism).131 To be clear, the rise of guidelines
sentencing was not necessarily justified in terms of ensuring more or less
punishment; instead, the goal was to ensure that the right punishment was
meted out.132 That is, the private fiefdoms of criminal court judges
nationwide were brought to heel under the control of a Progressive
governance regime.133
While guidelines sentencing has come under fire since its inception,134 at
least some commentators have argued that its shortcomings are not the result
125. See Rachel E. Barkow & Kathleen M. O’Neill, Delegating Punitive Power: The
Political Economy of Sentencing Commission and Guideline Formation, 84 TEX. L. R EV.
1973, 1988 n.68 (2006).
126. See generally M. Eve Hanan, Remorse Bias, 83 MO. L. REV. 301 (2018) (describing
the role of racial bias in judicial determinations of remorse at sentencing).
127. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 936 (2006).
128. See BIBAS, supra note 14, at 3 (describing a pre-professionalized historical moment
in which judges were “laymen representing the community’s sense of justice and order”).
129. See Alice Ristroph, How (Not) to Think Like a Punisher, 61 FLA. L. REV. 727, 727–
28 (2009) (“Sentencing may be science rather than art; it may require the analysis of empirical
data, and the question of appropriate punishment may be one for which there are objectively
ascertainable right and wrong answers.”).
130. See Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing After Booker, 48 CRIME & JUST. 137, 159
(2019).
131. See David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1791
(2005) (describing the tension between technocratic and democratic rule in the context of
sentencing guidelines).
132. See, e.g., Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding
and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 20
(2003).
133. See, e.g., Judge James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 179–80
(2010).
134. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure
of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85 (2005); Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure

2802

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

of the model or the technocratic turn; rather, guidelines sentencing—at least
according to some commentators—has been hamstrung by insufficient
insulation.135 As former U.S. Sentencing Commissioner Rachel Barkow
argues, the “Commission has rarely been left alone to make policy and
Congress has directed just about everything it has done over the years.”136
That is, the problem is not the experts, their judgments, or the way in which
their approaches to sentencing design failed to remedy the biases and views
that led to long sentences in the first place; rather, it’s that prosecutorial and
law enforcement lobbies and the elected officials defined by punitive
populism continued to exercise too much sway over the process.
Finally, the Model Penal Code (MPC) stands as the apotheosis of
educational expertise as a model for criminal policymaking. Drafted by
academics, elite practitioners, and other members of the American Law
Institute (ALI) during the 1950s and early 1960s, the MPC has been hailed
as one of “the most successful academic law reform projects ever
attempted.”137
Interestingly, while the ALI frequently produced
restatements—treatises that attempted to describe the state of the law—the
MPC was different; “it was an explicit attempt to provide a model statute that
would advance doctrine and practice rather than merely describe it.”138
Grounded perhaps in a similar impulse that led Herbert Wechsler, the
president of the ALI and one of the MPC’s primary drafters, to embrace
“neutral principles” in constitutional law,139 the MPC reflects an
understanding of an aspirational criminal law that might exist outside of
politics and the political process.140
III. THE LIMITATIONS OF TRADITIONAL EXPERTISE
The preference for expert-based decision-making that I describe in the
previous part clearly predates the current political moment and the
fascination with expertise described at the outset of this Article.141 But, it is
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM . L. REV. 1315
(2005). See also Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion?: Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1958 (1988).
135. See, e.g., BARKOW, supra note 7, at 171.
136. Id.
137. Gerard E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The Challenge
of the Special Part, 2 BUFF. CRIM . L. REV. 297, 297 (1998).
138. Christopher Slobogin, Introduction to the Symposium on the Model Penal Code’s
Sentencing Proposals, 61 FLA. L. REV. 665, 665 (2009). But see Anita Bernstein,
Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles and the Prescription of Masculine Order,
54 V AND. L. REV. 1367, 1368 n.1 (2001) (raising the possibility that the MPC was, in effect,
a sort of restatement).
139. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
140. Even within the discourse on educational expertise, though, claims to neutrality,
legitimacy, and expertise can be—and are—challenged on their own terms. See Markus Dirk
Dubber, Penal Panopticon: The Idea of a Modern Model Penal Code, 4 BUFF. CRIM . L. R EV.
53, 83 (2000).
141. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. And, indeed, “scientific” approaches to
criminal law and criminology have a long history. See generally CESARE BECCARIA, ON
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worth recognizing the ways in which the turn to expertise operates as a
response to the threat of (prejudiced or reactionary) populism—real or
imagined.142 In other words, “the rule of expertise could be valorized . . .
because it supplants and suppresses folk wisdom or traditional cultural
tendencies—arguably incendiary knowledges to be feared in law and
politics.”143 The expert is understood as unburdened by the emotions,
impulsiveness, and prejudices that define much of politics.144
But the turn to expertise should raise some concerns. Expertise, appeals
to experts, and the language of neutrality are not neutral.145 They are
political.146 Indeed, immediately after famously observing that “[t]he life of
the law has not been logic: it has been experience,” Oliver Wendell Holmes
went on to argue that “[t]he felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral
and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious,
even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do . . . [with] determining the rules by which men should
be governed.”147
For those concerned about “intuitions” and “prejudices,” educational
expertise might offer some improvements over a vocational model. And, it
might—at least ostensibly—offer a check on the punitive impulses that have

CRIMES AND P UNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS (Aaron Thomas ed., Aaron Thomas &
Jeremy Parzen trans., 2008) (1764); GINA LOMBROSO-F ERRERO, CRIMINAL M AN:
ACCORDING TO THE C LASSIFICATION OF C ESARE LOMBROSO (1911).
142. See BIBAS, supra note 14, at 121–22.
143. Schlag, supra note 18, at 67.
144. Cf. KENNEDY, supra note 38, at 165 (“To challenge the expert work of people in
sophisticated fields by linking it to political interests and ideologies can make you sound shrill,
lacking nuance. It can violate the style rather than discredit the content of expert work and
mark you as an outsider.”); Watts, supra note 37, at 30 (“[E]xpertise tends to be associated
with positive attributes and politics with negative attributes . . . .”).
145. See, e.g., Aziza Ahmed, Trafficked?: AIDS, Criminal Law and the Politics of
Measurement, 70 U. MIAMI L. R EV. 96, 151 (2015) (“While measurement and indicators are
treated as an objective and neutral way to move away from ideological debates and towards
documenting realities, this paper argues that measuring and data-gathering itself is a political
process.”); James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social
Thought, 133 U. P A. L. REV. 685, 699 (1985) (“By appearing to be neutral to ends, or by
merely offering means to reach pre-selected ends, the ideology of technocracy actually
buttresses the status quo.”); Jedediah Britton-Purdy et al., Building a Law-and-PoliticalEconomy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784, 1831
(2020) (describing “purportedly neutral and technocratic visions for rationalizing governance”
as “neither neutral nor, in practice, rationalizing”); Sheila Jasanoff, A Field of Its Own: The
Emergence of Science and Technology Studies, in THE O XFORD H ANDBOOK OF
INTERDISCIPLINARITY 173, 177–78, 184–85 (Robert Frodeman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2017).
146. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 38, at 121 (“Experts make arguments . . . for a reason:
their assertions are motivated. Often, the motivation is their role in a distributive struggle.”);
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 480 n.88 (2003) (collecting sources); David M.
Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. R EV. 575,
618 (1984) (“For the Critical scholar, the pretense that social science methods lead to objective
and value neutral knowledge hides an implicit and conservative political message behind a
neutral and technocratic façade.”).
147. O LIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR ., THE COMMON LAW 3–4 (1881).
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driven voters and elected officials to construct the carceral state.148 Indeed,
this concern about irrationality appears to motivate many of the
contemporary calls for bureaucratization: by turning to experts who can
analyze data and weigh costs and benefits, policy makers could pursue
“rational” approaches designed to steer the country away from the prejudice
and reactive vengefulness that have defined the era of mass incarceration.149
Or, at the very least, by shifting more decision-making power to experts,
politicians and voters could provide some insulation from the worst
tendencies of punitive populism.150
In this part, though, I push back on those claims by surfacing some
problematic assumptions that underpin this expert turn and by stressing the
value-laden decisions that undergird the ostensible neutrality of traditional
expertise. Specifically, I focus on two questions that traditional theories of
expertise often raise or leave unanswered. First, I argue that the turn to
expertise frequently rests on a faulty premise that a consensus (or at least a
general agreement) on the fundamental purpose of the criminal system exists.
For expertise to have a meaningful impact, for technocracy’s advantages to
kick in, and for the analogies to agency experts to work, I contend that there
would need to be an agreement on the first principles of criminal policy—an
agreement that is lacking in academic and popular discourse about the
criminal system.
Second, I argue that the promise of expert
decision-making—neutral and objective analysis divorced from political
pressure and populist sentiments—remains unattainable. Instead, I argue that
the interpretive and analytical tasks that experts or technocrats would
undertake are inherently political; there is no way to do policy or interpret
data that isn’t rooted in a deeper set of values and assumptions about how the
world works and should work.
In leveling these critiques or raising these questions, I do not mean to reject
technocratic critiques of democratic approaches whole hog—it would be a
mistake to discount the role of electoral politics and “punitive populism” in
driving mass incarceration. Nor do I mean to suggest that traditional experts
haven’t played a role and don’t have a role to play in dismantling the carceral
state. Indeed, as noted throughout, I see the technocracy/democracy
distinction as potentially misleading.151 And, it is inevitable (and probably a
good thing) that actors with specialized knowledge and various epistemic
advantages will take on different roles within any decision-making or
policymaking process. Rather, I argue that a space of expertise divorced
148. See generally BARKOW, supra note 7.
149. See generally JOHN F. P FAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE C AUSES OF M ASS
INCARCERATION— AND HOW TO ACHIEVE R EAL R EFORM (2017) (calling for a broader
engagement with data in addressing mass incarceration); Erin R. Collins, Abolishing the
Evidence-Based Paradigm (Feb. 27, 2022) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
150. Cf. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2379 (2006) (“Independence might also be sought through cultural
means, such as the cultivation of Weberian, professionalized expertise in administration and
public acceptance that this expertise provides a legitimate basis for administrators to resist the
pressures of elected officials.”).
151. See supra Part I; infra Part III.B.1.
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from politics and other social forces exists only in theory; in practice,
expertise and its applications are and always have been products of their
social, cultural, and political contexts.152 They add value; but that value is
bounded, and its relative worth rests on political decisions about the nature
of policymaking, the way to interpret facts, and the way to mobilize truth
claims.
A. First Principles
1. Purposes of Punishment?
In his seminal characterization of criminal procedure as an “administrative
system,” U.S. Circuit Judge Gerard Lynch described that system as
“serv[ing] the interests both of defendants seeking certainty of result and a
public that sees the primary purpose of the system as the protection of the
public and the reduction of crime.”153 Whether institutional actors and the
system actually do serve those interests is a fair question.154 Indeed, one
common justification for the bureaucratic turn is that the system and
voter-supported policies have not effectively or efficiently advanced public
safety.155 And, assuming that there were a broader societal agreement that
the purposes articulated by Judge Lynch were the “right” ones, we certainly
might (and probably should) strive to determine whether the administration
of the criminal system were serving those ends.156
But, when it comes to criminal law and its administration, there is hardly
an agreement as to what the system is supposed to do. As a preliminary
matter, much writing on the purposes of the criminal system is not entirely
clear as to whether it is providing (1) an attempt to justify the current
workings of the system, (2) an explanation for how institutional actors
understand the justifications of their decisions, or (3) an argument for how
the system ought to operate. Substantive criminal law classes and
conventional accounts emphasize the “traditional” purposes or justifications
of punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution.157
152. See KENNEDY, supra note 38, at 3 (“Although experts routinely imagine their work as
a technical and pragmatic practice at least aspirationally removed from conflict and political
contestation, the idea that ‘politics’ is somehow different is its own kind of expert fantasy.”).
153. Lynch, supra note 97, at 2142.
154. Cf. generally BARKOW, supra note 7 (critiquing criminal policy as irrational and
failing to serve the interests of ensuring public safety).
155. Barkow’s work, in particular, tends to reflect this important insight—regardless of
one’s view on whether the shift to an administrative model is socially desirable, there is
something particularly troubling about a poorly structured administrative system that fails to
achieve the stated or desired aims. See generally id. Cf. Jeffrie G. Murphy, In the Penal
Colony and Why I Am Now Reluctant to Teach Criminal Law, 33 CRIM . JUST. ETHICS 72, 77
(2014) (“The stated purpose of our system is said . . . to achieve a reasonable degree of crime
control while constrained by the justice requirement of punishing in accord with actual
culpability. What we actually have, however, is neither an efficient mechanism of crime
control nor a system that is just to offenders.”).
156. See generally Barkow, supra note 119.
157. See Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 454
(2013) (identifying “the four traditional purposes of punishment”).
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However, there is not real agreement on which of those theories the system
should advance, let alone which theory, or theories, it actually does advance.
Other commentators have thrown additional theories into the mix, from
expressivism,158 to distribution or redistribution (either of pleasure and pain,
resources, or social standing).159 Academic and judicial treatments of
constitutional criminal procedure similarly reflect common themes or
statements of purpose: efficiency, fairness, accuracy, and some concern
about curbing illegitimate state power.160 And, more radical or critical
treatments of the criminal system suggest other more explicitly nefarious
purposes—perhaps social control, maintenance of societal hierarchies, or
legitimation of inequality or the dominant social order.161
Further, these theories of punishment and procedural values don’t even
begin to describe, justify, or explain many features of the system that are less
easily identified with the administration of criminal law. For example, police
officers serve a range of social functions and deliver a range of social services
that have little (if anything) to do with enforcing criminal law162—even if
there were an agreed-upon reason why police should stop, search, or arrest
someone, what is the overarching theory for why police officers should
respond to nonemergency calls or respond to medical emergencies? In other
words, in the context of a weak social welfare state, where much regulatory
energy and many resources are directed toward the criminal system,163 it
158. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. P A. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret
Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 420 (1999).
159. See generally V INCENT C HIAO, CRIMINAL LAW IN THE AGE OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE S TATE 5, 63 (2019); Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law,
52 WM . & M ARY L. R EV. 1, 16 (2010) (discussing criminal law as distributing pain);
Benjamin Levin, Wage Theft Criminalization, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1429 (2021) (discussing
criminal law as redistributing resources).
160. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 383,
450 (2007); Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens’ Perceptions of the
Criminal Jury: Procedural Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 12 LAW & HUM . BEHAV.
333, 338 (1988).
161. See D AVID GARLAND, P UNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL
THEORY 3–22 (1990); GEORG R USCHE & OTTO KIRCHHEIMER , P UNISHMENT AND SOCIAL
STRUCTURE 108 (1939); Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed To: The
Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1478 (2016); Ahmed A. White,
Capitalism, Social Marginality, and the Rule of Law’s Uncertain Fate in Modern Society, 37
ARIZ. S T. L.J. 759, 786 (2005) (“Behind the façade of justifications, the criminal justice
system is an institution of social control oriented to the management of dysfunctions inherent
in capitalist society—unemployment, poverty, and the like—that, if left unchecked, tend to
produce untenable levels of social disorder and deviance.”). See generally Allegra M.
McLeod, Confronting Criminal Law’s Violence: The Possibilities of Unfinished Alternatives,
8 HARV. UNBOUND 109 (2013); Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism,
133 HARV. L. R EV. 1 (2019).
162. See, e.g., Monica C. Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 650, 761
(2020); Monica C. Bell, Situational Trust: How Disadvantaged Mothers Reconceive Legal
Cynicism, 50 LAW & SOC ’Y REV. 314, 335–38 (2016); Barbara Fedders, Opioid Policing, 94
IND. L.J. 389, 426 (2019).
163. See generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE I LLUSION OF FREE M ARKETS:
P UNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER (2011); ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE
WAR ON P OVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN
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becomes even more difficult to tease out what exactly all the actors and
institutions that comprise the criminal system are supposed to be doing in the
first place.
To be clear, answering that first-principles question (i.e., what’s the point
of it all?) is critically important and probably should be a prerequisite to many
discussions—both macro and micro—about how the system should be
reformed, whether it needs to be reformed, or whether it should be scrapped
altogether.164 But, those first-principles questions are not questions for
experts, and no one claims that they should be.165 Even if we were prepared
to accept that there were spaces where expert decision-making could be
relatively neutral or at least could enjoy clear advantages over other models,
“removing choices to neutral technocratic territory is unlikely when there is
dispute over what values should govern the choice.”166 Or, put differently,
the turn to expertise and the suggestion that technocrats could provide
solutions risk obscuring the live political debates and disagreements
simmering below the surface of this high-level policy analysis. And, “by
withdrawing political questions from the public sphere and giving them over
to expert decisionmaking, technocratic rationality actually diminishes the
possibility of democratic debate over ends, in the name of an improved
analysis of means.”167
Continuing the analogy to administrative law discussed in the previous
part, it’s not clear what the purpose of the authorizing statute or statutes is.
Certainly, that is not an uncommon situation—given the realities of the
lawmaking process, some degree of uncertainty is hardly unusual.168 But,
AMERICA (2016); LOÏC WACQUANT, P UNISHING THE P OOR :
THE N EOLIBERAL
GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL I NSECURITY (2009).
164. See generally Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117
MICH. L. REV. 259 (2018) (arguing for the importance of clarifying first-principles
commitments in discussions of criminal policy).
165. That is, scholars and advocates who turn to expert-based decision-making do so by
claiming that such decision-making operates against a backdrop of a given value, purpose, or
set of preferences that society (or a given community) seek to advance. See, e.g., Kagan, supra
note 37, at 2353 (“[A]gency experts have neither democratic warrant nor special competence
to make the value judgments—the essentially political choices—that underlie most
administrative policymaking.”); Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of
Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. R EV. 1127, 1137 (2010) (“Nor can agency officials
generally be seen as ‘experts’ on such value-laden (rather than solely scientific or technical)
policy questions.”).
166. Kristen Underhill, Broken Experimentation, Sham Evidence-Based Policy, 38 YALE
L. & P OL’Y REV. 150, 187 (2019); cf. Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal Justice, 67 DUKE
L.J. 1381, 1431 (2018) (arguing that the problem with criminal policymaking may not be
cost-benefit analysis as such, but the way in which costs and benefits are conceived and
conceptualized).
167. Boyle, supra note 145, at 751; see also Jürgen Habermas, The Scientization of Politics
and Public Opinion, in TOWARD A R ATIONAL SOCIETY: STUDENT P ROTEST, SCIENCE, AND
P OLITICS 62 (Jeremy J. Shapiro trans., 1970).
168. See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Often there is so much
legislative history that a court can manipulate the meaning of a law by choosing which snippets
to emphasize.”); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909, 933–34 (2016)
(“The legislative history of most federal statutes is extensive, and debate on the House and
Senate floor often produces competing statements about a statute’s meaning.”).
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the question of which purpose to favor or how to go about prioritizing the
interests to be advanced is contested. Indeed, the specter of debate, struggle,
or contestation should be a critical component of any discussion of
expertise.169 Even though “[institutional] insiders imagine themselves as
agents of the general interest,” they often advance a specific set of debatable
policy preferences or ideological goals.170 This absence of neutrality may
always pose problems,171 but these concerns are magnified significantly
when the experts have no clear directive.172 With no clear values to
prioritize, with no predetermined benefits to weigh against costs, and with no
overriding directive, experts become policy makers. Maybe that is an
acceptable or good result. But, accepting that result means accepting that
those experts are making the threshold political decisions that usually
precede their fine-tuning. And, accepting that result would require truly
embracing technocracy and accepting that the contested values and political
struggles traditionally associated with electoral politics have been sublimated
into the role of experts.
2. Abolition (or Something Like It)
Relatedly, there remains an open question about how to discuss optimizing
criminal law and punishment if commentators disagree about whether there
should be criminal law and punishment.173 Put differently, a debate about
the purposes of punishment and how best to achieve them appears to
presuppose an agreement that academics, activists, policy makers, and
members of the polity want the criminal system to do a better job achieving
those ends. Even if we set aside the first-principles disagreements discussed
in the previous section, what should we make of serious and growing strands
of legal thought and activism that reflect “criminal law skepticism?”174 If,
for example, one believes that the criminal system is designed as an engine
of social control to advance racial subordination, to reify class hierarchies, or
to preserve inequality,175 it seems unlikely that the prospect of a better
169. Cf. KENNEDY, supra note 38, at 108 (“Expertise is special knowledge made real as
authority in struggle.”).
170. Id. at 104.
171. See infra Part III.B.1.
172. See BRINT, supra note 105, at 17 (“Without a strong sense of the public and social
purposes served by professional knowledge, professionals tend to lose their distinctive voice
in public debate.”).
173. As I see it, the turn to educational expertise reflects a belief that institutional actors
need to do a better job. In other words, the claim or analysis relies on a belief that the system
can and should be optimized.
174. See generally Douglas Husak, The Price of Criminal Law Skepticism: Ten Functions
of the Criminal Law, 23 NEW CRIM . L. REV. 27 (2020).
175. Recent U.S. abolitionist accounts generally rely on such claims. See generally Butler,
supra note 161; Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L.
REV. 1156, 1188 (2015); Roberts, supra note 161. Not all abolitionist arguments reflect this
frame or U.S.-specific story of raced and classed subordination, but a general claim that the
institutions of punishment are irredeemable remains a common feature. See, e.g., WILLEM DE
HAAN, THE P OLITICS OF R EDRESS: CRIME, P UNISHMENT, AND P ENAL ABOLITION (1990);
THOMAS M ATHIESEN, THE P OLITICS OF ABOLITION R EVISITED (2015); Máximo Langer,
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functioning system steered by experts is particularly appealing or responsive.
A system that does a better job delivering abuse, injustice, and violence may
be even more objectionable than one that is slapdash and poorly run.176
By way of example, take the case of Eighth Amendment
conditions-of-confinement challenges. Incarcerated people bring numerous
lawsuits arguing that they are being deprived of their constitutional rights due
to the inhumane state of the prisons in which they are held.177 Via the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Congress dramatically limited the ability of
incarcerated plaintiffs to bring such suits and empowered federal judges to
dismiss them earlier and more easily.178 The landscape of prison law, then,
reflects strong norms of deference in which judges throw up their hands and
decline to interfere with the expertise of prison officials.179 Academics and
advocates have bemoaned this approach and the deference to experts.180 But
why?
The answer may be that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) or state
equivalents are not experts and therefore should not be entitled to set policy,
make rules, and govern the day-to-day operations of carceral institutions.
That is, deferring to the BOP is somehow worse than deferring to some other
agency (e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency, the Food and Drug
Administration, or other agencies presumed to base their decision-making
authority on expertise) because the BOP lacks the expertise of those other
agencies. If so, though, why?
I take it that the answer reflects the mix of two related impulses181:
(1) there is no such thing as expertise in caging people—it is cruel and
inhumane, and no amount of educational or vocational experience should
constitute expertise such that an actor is worthy of deference; and (2) even if
some correctional officials might be experts (by dint of education, on-the-job
experience, or some mix of the two), they are unworthy of deference and

Penal Abolitionism and Criminal Law Minimalism: Here and There, Now and Then, 134
HARV. L. R EV. F. 42 (2020); cf. FOUCAULT, supra note 63, at 277 (“For the observation that
prison fails to eliminate crime, one should perhaps substitute the hypothesis that prison has
succeeded extremely well in producing delinquency . . . .”).
176. Certainly, this may not be true, and it may well depend on the specifics. But I do think
it is an open question. Cf. Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of
Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2196–98 (2013) (arguing that providing counsel to indigent
criminal defendants might not actually lead to more substantive justice and might legitimate
an unjust system); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections
on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355,
429–32 (1995) (making a similar argument regarding the death penalty).
177. See generally Schlanger, supra note 82.
178. See supra note 86.
179. See generally Dolovich, supra note 84.
180. See supra note 81 (collecting sources).
181. The different treatment of criminal law and other expert-dominated areas may also
have less to do with theoretical distinctions, and more to do with the social salience and
accessibility of the issues at hand in the criminal context. See BIBAS, supra note 14, at xvii
(“In other areas of government, rational apathy and faith in expertise leads voters to defer to
experts . . . . In contrast, many ordinary citizens do not defer to criminal justice experts but
show passionate interest in how insiders handle criminal cases.”).
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policymaking authority because of the cruelty of their enterprise.182 Similar
impulses may rear their heads elsewhere in discussions of criminal policy
and help to explain why progressive and left commentators, who are
otherwise enthusiastic about agency deference, remain hostile to delegations
of power in the criminal realm.
In other words, if a significant strand of scholarship and activism relating
to the criminal system contests the fundamental legitimacy or desirability of
its institutions,183 what role could experts possibly play? Perhaps, experts
could produce better plans for scaling back and ultimately doing away with
prisons, prosecutions, and policing. (And, indeed, maybe that’s the
understanding of expertise’s potential that helps undergird some
commentators’ proposals.) Nevertheless, it is worth noting how that
understanding of expertise differs from the model of expertise evoked by
analogies to other corners of the administrative state. The turn to educational
expertise presumes that—even if the criminal system shouldn’t resemble an
administrative or managerial process—the system can be improved by
empowering skilled and knowledgeable actors to manage the system and
make it run better.184 If “running better” means not running at all, then this
turn to educated experts appears to hold much less promise.
B. Values and Assumptions
Even if there were an agreed-upon purpose of the criminal system, turning
to experts to achieve that desired purpose still should raise some concerns.
The primary justifications for expertise articulated in many corners of the
literature sound in the language of neutrality and reliability.185 Unlike lay
voters, experts bring something special—their analysis and proposals are
supported by a specific scientific (or quasi-scientific) method. Biases and
imperfections might sneak into that analysis, but better data collection, more
sophisticated regressions, greater methodological rigor, and better-trained
experts could minimize those fears. In short, experts purport to offer indicia
of neutrality, rationality, and reliability, while voters, community members,
and others whose preferences, decision-making, and interpretive approaches
may reflect emotion, prejudice, or irrationality.
To be clear, I share concerns about prejudice and moral panics in the
drafting and enforcement of criminal law.186 Any account of mass

182. See Levin, supra note 12, at 80–81.
183. See supra note 175 (collecting sources).
184. See supra Part II.B.
185. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 765 (2005)
(“When the Supreme Court upheld the Sentencing Commission against separation of powers
challenges in Mistretta v. United States, it characterized the agency as an ‘expert body’
engaged in an ‘essentially neutral endeavor.’ The image of the Sentencing Commission as an
independent agency, divorced from politics, was a strong one.” (footnotes omitted)).
186. As discussed later, though, framing the problems with the criminal system as its
irrationality or emotion-driven dimensions understates the ways in which rationality and what
purports to be cold neutrality have actually operated as significant drivers of mass
incarceration and the new penology. See infra Part III.B.2. See generally Malcolm M. Feeley
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incarceration (whether framed as pro-technocracy/bureaucracy or not) needs
to grapple with the role of electoral politics and public support for punitive
policies.187 But, this pro-expert frame often understates or sidesteps two
interrelated issues: (1) the ways in which expertise, data, and ostensibly
neutral methods are always embedded in politics and (2) the reality that
experts (both vocational and educational), not just emotion-driven voters,
have been key players in constructing the carceral state. In this section, I
address each concern in turn.
1. Politics All the Way Down
To a certain extent, many reformist, pro-expertise arguments rest on an
analogy to administrative law and a belief that social science and apolitical
decision-making could lead more efficiently to objectively good policy.
Importantly, though, even within the realm of administrative law, expertise—
particularly when framed as apolitical—remains a fraught concept. As one
commentator puts it, “By the end of the twentieth century, the New Deal view
of the agency-as-expert—providing neutral, sociotechnical expertise to
resolve society’s problems—was all but dead, and the agencies’ authoritative
role was in a state of crisis.”188 Part of that crisis stemmed from a recognition
that “sociotechnical expertise” was much harder to divorce from policy
questions and policymaking than it appeared.189 While “[l]egal institutions
and the citizenry at large” continue to “suffer from a science obsession,
assuming that if only we had answers from science, we would know what
regulatory decisions are ‘correct,’” that view runs headlong into the realities
of policymaking.190 “[T]he ultimate decisions that must be made are policy
choices.”191 Even when expertise is framed in scientific terms or is grounded
in scientific methods, “policy informs everything from how an experiment is
designed to how results are interpreted and communicated.”192
That observation certainly hasn’t led to the demise of the administrative
state. But, these insights have helped fuel a broader set of critiques of
expertise and expert-based decision-making. In describing the rise of
& Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and
Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1992).
187. See generally FORMAN, supra note 7; GOTTSCHALK, THE P RISON AND THE GALLOWS,
supra note 7; NICOLA LACEY, THE P RISONERS’ D ILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND
P UNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES (2008); MILLER , supra note 9.
188. Wendy E. Wagner, A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise with
Presidential Power, 115 COLUM . L. REV. 2019, 2025 (2015).
189. See id. (“[I]t became increasingly apparent—through a variety of sources—that the
science-intensive problems faced by federal agencies were even more policy-laden than
initially believed and that, consequently, the agencies enjoyed substantial policymaking power
in selecting the best alternative from among a wide range of choices.”).
190. Meazell, supra note 119, at 744.
191. Id.
192. Id.; see also EDLEY, supra note 37, at 190 (calling for agencies to “frankly
acknowledge the role of political, ideological, or subjective analyses in their reasons and
findings rather than attempting to obscure those elements behind the filigree so readily
generated by the scientific and adjudicatory fairness methods of decision making and
explanation”).
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“systems analysis” and cost-benefit analysis as the dominant approaches to
policy questions during the mid-twentieth century, Professor Bernard
Harcourt has stressed the ways in which social scientific or scientific
language masks politics.193 Despite the purported neutrality of the experts
tasked with solving social problems, decisions about policy were
inevitably going to involve choices . . . that are invariably normative and
political in nature. They are decisions that implicate political values.
However, they are treated as a technical step in the [systems analysis] and
most often delegated to the systems analysts, public policy professionals,
or cost-benefit experts rather than to the democratic political process. And
therein lies the problem: systems-analytic methods are portrayed as
scientific, objective, and neutral tools, when in fact they necessarily entail
normative choices about political values at every key step.194

Similarly, in her genealogical look at the “idea of ‘the criminal justice
system,’” Professor Sara Mayeux argues that the use of both the system
metaphor and the rhetoric of systems theory invites a specific vision of
criminal law and institutional change.195 The language connotes a set of
actors and institutions as “self-regulating, through various governing
mechanisms and feedback loops . . . and as always working towards some
systemic function or goal. Once mapped and understood, systems can be
modified—they can be made more efficient, or more accurate—but only
within some outer set of limits or bounds.”196
In both accounts, the turn to a “system” as the metaphor for the messy,
localized, and highly context-specific administration of criminal law invites
a certain vision steeped in science, logic, inevitability, and perfectibility.
Within the preestablished confines of the system, experts “have learned to
see order and system in the world rather than struggle, and too often
experience their expertise as clear and persuasive, underestimating the
plasticity, ambivalence, and conflicted nature of what they know.”197 The
vision is tempting, not only because it may jibe with the worldview of
managerial and professional class commentators who see in it a sort of clarity
and familiarity (i.e., these are, after all, the sorts of problems that we have
been trained to solve),198 but also because it is so eminently manageable.199
Thinking about a criminal system that could be assessed, calibrated, and then
repaired invites proposals, policy analysis, and a shared sense that if only the

193. See generally Harcourt, supra note 11.
194. Id. at 421.
195. Mayeux, supra note 11, at 58–60.
196. Id. at 60.
197. KENNEDY, supra note 38, at 277.
198. Indeed, this vision also resonates with a certain characterization of “legal science” or
a formalist understanding of the practice of law. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 55, at 1.
199. See Wagner, supra note 188, at 2024 (“This important role of agency-as-expert
coincided with the inherently optimistic belief that there were ‘objectively correct solution[s]
to the country’s problems.’” (quoting Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts,
Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 417
(2007)).
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right people, resources, and metrics were deployed, society could get it
right.200
And therein lies the appeal of educational expertise—the conception that
goes hand in hand with the scientific approach critically described by
Harcourt and Mayeux. Politics are messy. People are unpredictable and
irrational. And, confronting the specific, localized pathologies of thousands
of criminal systems is daunting. Turning to experts and their potential neutral
principles and applications provides some optimism and promises to
transform a Sisyphean task into something digestible, manageable, and
improvable—if not actually fixable.201
The problem, of course, is that such an imagined system, administered by
experts, is only that: imagined.202 Politics, biases, value judgments, and
assumptions about what the world should look like or what is an acceptable
policy solution necessarily shape any interpretive exercise.203 Once we move
past some universe of generally agreed-upon facts about the world, what
comes next necessarily implicates ideology, politics, and a set of contested
assumptions about what to do with those facts.204 Or, to return to the
beginning of the Article, even if there are factual questions that could be
resolved with some degree of certainty (as in the case of how a virus is
transmitted), that does not tell us what to do with the answers to such
questions. Just because we know that a virus is transmitted via aerosols, for
example, does not and cannot answer the difficult policy questions of how to
respond to that knowledge and how to contain that virus.205
Granted, a truly postmodern account might suggest that there are no such
“generally agreed upon facts”—every truth claim is socially constructed and
contingent.206 But, one need not accept such a totalizing critique or relativist
200. See Foucault, supra note 24, at 30 (“This re-inforces [sic] the idea that for judicial
proceedings to be just they must be conducted by someone who can remain quite detached, by
an intellectual, an expert in the realm of ideas.”).
201. This is not to say that more small-bore, fine-grained attention to the detailed operation
of specific “criminal justice systems” might not be doable and might not bear fruit from both
an academic perspective (i.e., allowing for greater precision in the object of study) and from
a policy standpoint (i.e., allowing for greater precision in the institutional levers that require
adjustment, improvement, or elimination).
202. See Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 ANN. REP. A.B.A.
331, 359 (1938) (“The professed ideal of an independent commission of experts above politics
and reaching scientific results by scientific means, has no correspondence with reality.”).
203. Cf. BIBAS, supra note 14, at 165 (“[T]oo often professionals are blind to their own
shortcomings and how their own views and self-interest need checking too. Insiders need to
check outsiders, but outsiders likewise need to check insiders.”); WEBER, supra note 114, at
28 (“No science is absolutely free of assumptions . . . .”).
204. See KENNEDY, supra note 38, at 131 (“It is useful to distinguish knowledge that is
widely shared or taken for granted from points about which people in the field disagree when
they argue about what is legal, what policy to adopt, or who should do what. The line between
them is not firm.”).
205. See WEBER, supra note 114, at 17 (quoting Tolstoy’s statement that “[s]cience . . . has
no answer to the only questions that matter to us: ‘What should we do? How shall we live?’”).
206. See, e.g., James Clifford, Introduction: Partial Truths, in WRITING CULTURE: THE
P OETICS AND P OLITICS OF E THNOGRAPHY 1, 6 (James Clifford & George E. Marcus eds.,
1986) (arguing that some postmodern critiques have resorted “to the banal claim that all truths
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posture in order to conclude that there are only so many uncontested facts
and that “data” can only ever get us so far in a debate about policy.207 In
other words, even if we all agreed on data about crime rates, the frequency
of police stops for different racial groups, or the likelihood of recidivism, that
wouldn’t tell us how to respond or what to do with that data.
Data, information, and facts (which may or may not be one in the same)
are not self-interpreting or self-executing.208 To have meaning and to
translate to discrete policies, they require someone to do the interpreting and
analyzing.209 All of which is not to say that data about the criminal system
and the administration of criminal law are not helpful; they are.210 But we
should be careful about identifying how and why they are helpful—not
because they allow for incontrovertible best practices, but because they help
to clarify what is actually happening on the ground and to lay bare the politics
and heuristics that the “experts” are applying.211
Scholars of administrative law have identified a related set of practices and
impulses as “the science charade.”212 In the agency context, “scientists and
bureaucrats fail to identify the gaps left by uncertain science or to reveal the
policy choices made to fill those gaps. . . . These behaviors undercut
transparency . . . [and] hinder participation and accountability because they
drown policy choices in inaccessible science.”213 That is, while judges often

are constructed”); Gary Minda, One Hundred Years of Modern Legal Thought: From
Langdell and Holmes to Posner and Schlag, 28 IND. L. REV. 353, 354 (1995)
(“[P]ostmodernism signals a movement away from forms of legal modernism premised upon
the belief in universal truths, core essences, or foundational theories.”). On the construction
of “facts” and “truth,” see generally M ARY P OOVEY, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN F ACT
P ROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE SCIENCES OF WEALTH AND SOCIETY (1998).
207. See KENNEDY, supra note 38, at 131. See generally HARCOURT, supra note 29;
Meares & Harcourt, supra note 29.
208. See, e.g., Meazell, supra note 119, at 743 (“The bottom line is that where there is
scientific uncertainty, policy must fill the gap.”).
209. See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 30, at 3214–15; WEBER, supra note 114, at 17–18.
210. See generally Crespo, supra note 90; see also Meares & Harcourt, supra note 29, at
735; Ocen, supra note 16, at 239.
211. See, e.g., Meares & Harcourt, supra note 29, at 735 (“Judicial decisions that address
the relevant social science and empirical data are more transparent in that they expressly
articulate the grounds for factual assertions and, as a result, more clearly reflect the interpretive
choices involved in criminal procedure decision-making.”); Deborah Jones Merritt,
Constitutional Fact and Theory: A Response to Chief Judge Posner, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1287,
1287 (1999) (“[E]mpirical knowledge is most useful in unmasking the theoretical assumptions
that undergird constitutional law . . . .”); Schlag, supra note 18, at 8 (“[A]ny responsible
rejection of expertise as a knowledge-form must contend with the ‘the compared to what?’
question—a question which no doubt would reveal that some (many?) of the available options
are arguably even less appealing.”).
212. See generally Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95
COLUM . L. REV. 1613 (1995).
213. Meazell, supra note 119, at 751–52.
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base their deference on administrative expertise and appeals to science,214
the veneer of scientific objectivity may be thinner than it initially appears.215
In fairness, thoughtful and reflective calls for expertise tend to concede
and internalize some of these critical observations. Scholars of the
administrative state and other expert-based structures have outlined the ways
in which everything from outright capture to implicit bias may well interfere
with an idealized technocratic model.216 Indeed, a major question in many
accounts is how best to go about insulating experts from external political
forces,217 or perhaps how to incorporate political inputs in ways that support
democratic values without undermining expert authority.218
While those strike me as admirable goals, and while I appreciate the move
to add nuance to the technocratic turn, I still think that these moves raise two
unanswered questions: First, what is the vision of “politics” at play here?
I read most of these accounts as focused on electoral politics. The claim is
that there could be experts insulated (at least relatively) from electoral
pressures. Given the way that elections drive punitive politics, perhaps that’s
a worthy goal. But, what about politics in the sense of ideology?219 That is,
appointed judges may be insulated from the wrath of voters, but they are
political actors in that they are embedded in a political culture and decide
cases filtered through the lens of their political commitments.220 I see that
214. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)
(“[A] reviewing court must remember that the Commission is making predictions, within its
area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science. When examining this kind of scientific
determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at
its most deferential.”); see also Meazell, supra note 119, at 734–35 (describing this process as
“super deference”).
215. See Gruber, supra note 30, at 3215 (“Distributional analysis thus calls on critical
empirical scholars to retain skepticism of objectivity, be aware that design choices and data
labeling are value laden, and be mindful of critical race, feminist, and other anti-subordination
concerns when collecting and presenting data.”).
216. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 21–24 (2010) (describing widespread scholarly
concern about capture); Sharon B. Jacobs, The Statutory Separation of Powers, 129 YALE L.J.
378, 432–37 (2019) (describing approaches to dealing with capture); Richard L. Revesz,
Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. R EV. 1717, 1766–71
(1997).
217. See, e.g., BARKOW, supra note 7, at 171 (attributing the failures of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, at least in part, to overinvolvement from Congress and arguing that other expert
bodies require further insulation).
218. See, e.g., Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 41, at 1834 (“[P]olicing agencies may
only act pursuant to sufficient democratic authorization. Such authorization can . . . be the
product of administrative notice-and-comment rulemaking, in which public participation is
welcomed. . . . But, in one form or another, democratic authorization is vital.”); Slobogin,
supra note 41, at 139 (advocating for administrative-agency-style oversight of policing that
incorporates aspects of “notice-and-comment”).
219. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Several Meanings of “Politics” in Judicial Politics
Studies: Why “Ideological Influence” Is Not “Partisanship,” 61 EMORY L.J. 759, 770 (2012)
(“‘Politics’ is also often used as synonymous with ‘ideology’—an opaque term that
encompasses the totality of a judge’s views about politics, morality, economics, society,
religion, and life.”).
220. See J AMES B. ATLESON, V ALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW
1–4 (1983); GARY MINDA, BOYCOTT IN AMERICA: HOW IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY
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vision of politics as critically important but also inescapable. All the
insulation in the world doesn’t seem as though it could (or perhaps should)
keep experts from being political actors in that sense.
Second, if these deeper political commitments or biases are inescapable,
then what is the advantage of relying on these educated experts over other
political actors? Once we concede that experts are susceptible to the same
prejudices and vicissitudes as voters and politicians, don’t they lose much of
their epistemic advantage? If they cannot offer neutrality, don’t they risk
reinscribing a set of political preferences, but doing so with the patina of
legitimacy, science, and neutrality?221 Maybe they are still better than other
deciders,222 but I see that as a fundamentally political question and one that
should be framed as such and situated within a conversation about the
“commitments and constraints” of experts.223 Further, any such discussion
should involve considering the potential costs of expert legitimacy—should
we be concerned about decision-makers’ ability to wrap their decisions in the
language of science or the potentially unassailable trappings of authority?
2. A Carceral Track Record
The construction of the carceral state certainly has relied on voters’
punitive instincts and the mobilization of moral panics.224 But, an account
of mass incarceration that lays the blame entirely at the feet of nonexperts
and political forces (in the sense of electoral politics) would be woefully
incomplete. As Professor Alice Ristroph has argued, “measures of general
public punitiveness cannot provide a full account of how or why experts,
political officials, and legal professionals built a carceral state.”225 Indeed, a
thorough reckoning with how we arrived at the current state of affairs and
how we may take a different path going forward requires confronting the
“models and expectations of criminal law held by the most influential actors
in the criminal legal system,” including elite policy makers and academics.226

SHAPE THE LEGAL M IND 8–13 (1999). A similar observation could be made about career
federal prosecutors. If electoral politics were the only evil to be avoided or were the clear
driver of aggressive prosecutions, misconduct, and disparities in charging and plea bargaining
decisions, the federal system should be dramatically less objectionable than state systems.
221. See Ruha Benjamin, Introduction: Discriminatory Design, Liberating Imagination,
in CAPTIVATING TECHNOLOGY: RACE, CARCERAL TECHNOSCIENCE, AND LIBERATORY
IMAGINATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE 1, 3 (Ruha Benjamin ed., 2019).
222. See generally Sandra G. Mayson, Bias in, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218 (2019)
(criticizing algorithmic risk assessment for recidivism analyses).
223. See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 60, at 267 (calling for further study of “the
particular commitments, constraints, and conceptualizations of current legal actors working
with the rules we hope to change”); see also Meazell, supra note 119, at 746 (“I do not mean
to suggest there is anything inherently wrong with such policy choices. To the contrary, they
cannot be avoided, and good scientific practice involves documenting those choices, providing
transparency and accountability.”).
224. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
225. Alice Ristroph, An Intellectual History of Mass Incarceration, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1949,
1955 (2019).
226. Id.
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When it comes to the construction of the contemporary criminal system,
the ostensibly rational and restrained experts who are offered in opposition
to the emotional and irrational political actors hardly have clean hands.
Punitive impulses and the tendency to use criminal law as a tool of social
control might be framed differently in different classes or communities, but
they have been features of U.S. politics.227 It is not at all clear that highly
educated actors and elite spaces have been immune to these cultural
pathologies. From the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,228 to problem-solving
courts,229 to algorithmic risk assessment tools,230 many of the expert- or
data-driven criminal justice reforms have failed to undermine the logics of
the carceral state.231 Some of the most maligned theories and practices of
criminal law’s administration over the last half century haven’t been the
product of tough-on-crime voters or politicians; instead, they have been
crafted by the sorts of experts frequently presented as potential technocratic
saviors.232 These experts have provided new vocabularies, new tools, and
new frameworks through which to consider the problems of the criminal
system, but they have not necessarily addressed a host of those problems,
such as expanding carceral populations, disparities across axes of race and
class, and the significant numbers of people under state surveillance or
control.233
In their influential 1992 article, The New Penology: Notes on the
Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, Professors Malcolm
Feeley and Jonathan Simon argued that the increasingly dominant paradigm
for criminal law and punishment was not necessarily grounded in a purely
moralist retributive frame.234 The governing ideology that Feeley and Simon
identified as “the new penology” was not visceral, emotional, or rooted in
populist impulses; it was decidedly technical, framed in the language and
logic of expertise.235 In their account, the new penology

227. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
229. See McLeod, supra note 100, at 1591. See generally Collins, supra note 95; Jessica
M. Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm, 53 AM . CRIM . L. REV. 595 (2016); Miller, supra note
100.
230. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Digitizing the Carceral State, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1723
(2019). See generally V IRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH
TOOLS P ROFILE , P OLICE, AND P UNISH THE P OOR (2018); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST
P REDICTION: P ROFILING, P OLICING, AND P UNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2006).
231. See generally Collins, supra note 149.
232. See, e.g., James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATL. MONTHLY,
Mar. 1982, at 29 (articulating the theory of broken windows policing).
233. See, e.g., Jessica M. Eaglin, The Perils of “Old” and “New” in Sentencing Reform,
76 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 355, 373–74 (2021) (describing issues with sentencing
guidelines and actuarial risk assessment); Jessica M. Eaglin, Technologically Distorted
Conceptions of Punishment, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 483, 543 (2019) (“By placing faith in
technology to save us from ourselves, are we turning a blind eye to the structural problems
that drive reliance on incarceration and the criminal apparatus more generally?”).
234. Feeley & Simon, supra note 186, at 451.
235. See id. at 452 (“A central feature of the new discourse is the replacement of a moral
or clinical description of the individual with an actuarial language.”).
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is concerned with techniques to identify, classify, and manage groupings
sorted by dangerousness. The task is managerial, not transformative. It
seeks to regulate levels of deviance, not intervene or respond to individual
deviants or social malformations.
. . . . It seeks to sort and classify, to separate the less from the more
dangerous, and to deploy control strategies rationally. The tools for this
enterprise are “indicators,” prediction tables, population projections, and
the like. In these methods, individualized diagnosis and response is
displaced by aggregate classification systems for purposes of surveillance,
confinement, and control.236

In other words, even as punitive populism defined much of mass cultural
discourse and helped shape electoral battles, the expert-driven universe of
criminal justice policy reflected an “emphasis on . . . formal rationality.”237
The new penology, then, represents an attempt to perfect social control: “It
is about identifying and managing unruly groups. It is concerned with the
rationality not of individual behavior or even community organization, but
of managerial processes.”238
The recognition that carceral logics are about control as much as, if not
more than, punishment has been reflected in the growing focus on
misdemeanors, low-level urban courts, and the process of “managerial
justice.”239 This insight resonates with Judge Lynch’s frame of the criminal
system and the rationale that has in turn led to an embrace of administrative
models for reform.240 But it also reflects a very different outlook: the
problem isn’t that our administrative system of criminal law is poorly run or
managed by the wrong experts; the problem is that the administrative model
is one based on a logic of social control and the mass processing of
marginalized people.241 And, the experts (both the vocational ones and the
educational ones) are guided by that same logic and approach.242 Improving
outcomes and dismantling these unjust institutions would require much more
than greater expert involvement; it would require a deep reckoning with the
fundamental logics that have allowed these institutions to proliferate in the
first place.

236. Id. (citations omitted).
237. Id. at 454.
238. Id. at 455.
239. See generally ISSA KOHLER -H AUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS
AND S OCIAL C ONTROL IN AN AGE OF B ROKEN W INDOWS P OLICING (2018); ALEXANDRA
NATAPOFF, P UNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW O UR M ASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM
TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL (2018).
240. See generally Lynch, supra note 97.
241. See Levin, supra note 12, at 82 (“If one believes that the system isn’t broken and
actually is working as it’s supposed to (i.e., as a vehicle of social control targeted at
marginalized populations), then the problem with the status quo is hardly its irrationality.”).
242. See generally ALEC K ARAKATSANIS, USUAL CRUELTY: THE COMPLICITY OF
LAWYERS IN THE CRIMINAL INJUSTICE SYSTEM (2019); Note, The Paradox of “Progressive
Prosecution,” 132 HARV. L. REV . 748 (2018).
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IV. LIVED EXPERIENCE AS EXPERTISE
The deconstruction of traditional expertise and the turn to a new, third
model flows not only from the critiques traced in the previous part, but from
another glaring question that advocates of technocratic governance often
leave unanswered: who is an expert? At first blush, perhaps the answer
seems clear: to the proponent of vocational expertise, an expert is the
experienced institutional actor, and to the proponent of educational expertise,
an expert is the well-educated person.
But who chooses those experts or assesses their qualifications? In the
courtroom setting, of course, tests and inquiries allow judges to distinguish
the “layperson” from the “expert.” In the scholarship and advocacy about
the role of experts in policymaking, though, who stand as the gatekeepers,
and how do they go about policing the boundaries of expertise? That answer
is rarely explicit, but the implicit suggestion appears to be other elite actors—
judges, elected officials, perhaps commissions, and maybe even academics.
For commentators focused on shifting power to marginalized groups, for
those convinced by the critiques articulated in the previous part, and
particularly for those who see those same elite actors as bearing responsibility
for the current state of affairs, such an approach is hardly satisfactory. In this
part, I outline what I take to be the critical response to the traditional
conceptions of expertise—a move to reimagine experts and expertise as
grounded in the theory and praxis of commentators committed to expanding
public participation in criminal law. True to the overall theme and purpose
of this Article, though, I also examine what I understand to be the unanswered
questions raised by this third model of expertise. Given that this model or
vision appears to have attracted less attention than the previous two, these
critical questions are perhaps more speculative—there is not a dominant
move or position in need of challenging and unpacking. Instead, my hope
here is to highlight areas for further study and analysis.
A. Deconstructing Expertise
Recent years have seen a shift in legal scholarship about the criminal
system. More and more academics have moved away from court-centric
treatments of constitutional criminal procedure and doctrinal accounts of
substantive criminal law’s development to focus on the politics and
institutions of the carceral state.243 One component of this move has been an
expansion of sources and forms of knowledge about the criminal system that
are treated as legitimate objects of study. From sociological accounts that
focus on marginalized communities’ interactions with courts and police,244
to treatments of activist literature as important sources from which to glean
243. See generally NATAPOFF, supra note 239 (focusing on criminal law as a process of
low-level social control); Levin, supra note 11 (describing these developments); Seth W.
Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179 (2014) (describing
often-neglected, nonjudicial forms of regulating police conduct).
244. See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126
YALE L.J. 2054, 2097 (2017). See generally Bell, supra note 16.
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policy proposals and different visions of institutional change,245 new
thinking about the criminal system reflects a capacious understanding of
where academics should look to learn how the criminal system works (and
doesn’t).
The debates about acceptable and legitimate forms of knowledge as
applied to criminal law are neither new nor unprecedented. Criminologist
Mariana Valverde has critiqued the “questionable binary” that has persisted
in the study of crime between “science (university-based science)” and
“social reform.”246 In calling for a new understanding of the place of crime
in society, Valverde has proposed a deeper engagement with “miserology,”
a collection of “non-institutionalized writings on pauperism, misery, political
economy, and social reform that flourished in the 1830s and 1840s.”247
These accounts—the work of novelists, social activists, and
philanthropists—focused on crime in context and as a part of the struggles of
a “new urban proletariat.”248 Valverde decries the ways in which this
nonformalized and nonacademic approach was rejected “in order to
establish . . . respectable university-based endeavors.”249
In some sense, we might understand the third conception of expertise as
rooted in a similar impulse that drives Valverde’s project: a search for the
new “miserologists,” for “ethically committed” insights into the injustices of
the contemporary criminal system.250 Rather than seeking the sorts of
institutional and official qualifications that define the two traditional models
of expertise, this third conception reflects Valverde’s focus on the lived
hardships of the individuals and communities that regularly are forced to
grapple with the realities of violence, crime, policing, and the institutions of
social control.251

245. See generally Akbar, supra note 109; Akbar, supra note 14. See also Amna A. Akbar,
Law’s Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC . 352, 373 (2015);
Rahman & Simonson, supra note 48, at 698; Simonson, Police Reform, supra note 16.
246. Valverde, supra note 16, at 332.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 330 (citation omitted).
249. Id. at 332.
250. See id.; see also Eisha Jain, Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor Myths, 98 B.U.
L. REV. 953, 979–80 (2018) (arguing that treatments of misdemeanors too often exclude the
practical realities of enforcement).
251. While reflecting a very different approach and set of political or ideological priors,
this understanding of expertise might find some purchase with Hayek’s characterization of
“local knowledge”:
[T]here is beyond question a body of very important but unorganized knowledge
which cannot possibly be called scientific in the sense of knowledge of general rules:
the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place. It is with respect
to this that practically every individual has some advantage over all others in that he
possesses unique information of which beneficial use might be made, but of which
use can be made only if the decisions depending on it are left to him or are made
with his active coöperation. We need to remember . . . how valuable an asset in all
walks of life is knowledge of people, of local conditions, and special circumstances.
Hayek, supra note 57, at 521–22. That said, “local knowledge” also may overlap significantly
with certain types of vocational expertise.
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Turns to a new model of expertise take different forms, and many are not
necessarily framed or phrased as “expertise.”252 But, they generally reflect
an interest in centering voices that are seen as excluded—much like those of
Valverde’s miserologists—from the dominant discourse of criminal law.253
Central to such a move is a reexamination of the structures and sources of
knowledge that underpin much of law, the criminal system, and the expert
institutions described in Part II.254 This project requires recognizing the
shortcomings of traditional sources of knowledge or expertise:
The legal scholar’s impulse is to say . . . [w]e know the problem. How are
we going to fix it? But “we” do not have a rich understanding of “the
problem.” Most legal and policy approaches that proceed under the banners
of racial justice and economic justice reveal a breathtaking cluelessness—
or, perhaps, willful flattening—of the nuanced realities that ghettoized
African Americans face on a daily basis.255

That is, a more radical frame for addressing mass criminalization necessitates
stepping outside of the confines of discussions about the “criminal justice
system” and small-bore approaches to “criminal justice reform.”256
For example, Professor Amna Akbar has called for lawyers, legal
academics, and elite actors in the legal system to “imagine with social
movements.”257 Akbar’s claim is rooted in a view that traditional legal
thought and practice (including categories associated with progressive or left
causes) are unduly constrained both in their conception of the problems to be
solved and in their ambition for change.258 And, despite popular
characterizations of academics as out-of-touch producers of far-fetched and
impractical proposals, Akbar contends that it is actually the activists and
actors from marginalized and subordinated communities who have expanded
the imagination or broadened the horizon of what society could look like and
how the criminal system could be transformed.259 Or, as attorney and
abolitionist activist Derecka Purnell puts it, “People on the streets, people
who are organizing, are gonna put certain things on the table that will rarely

252. Indeed, as discussed in the next section, it is worth considering the costs and benefits
of “expertise” as a frame or vehicle to advance the ends that might be associated with this
model of expertise. And, there might be a fundamental tension at play in the characterization
of the knowledge and experience described here as expertise. See infra Part IV.B.3. Or, as
abolitionist activist Derecka Purnell puts it: “the idea of being an abolitionist expert feels
counter to the communal politics of abolition.” Derecka Purnell (@dereckapurnell), TWITTER
(June 17, 2020, 4:01 PM) (emphasis added), https://twitter.com/dereckapurnell/status/
1273375358298009601 [https://perma.cc/94YU-AKA9].
253. See Bell, supra note 43, at 211. See generally Matthew Clair, Criminalized
Subjectivity: Du Boisian Sociology and Visions for Legal Change, 18 DU BOIS REV. 289
(2021).
254. Cf. BIBAS, supra note 14, at 34 (noting that some “outsiders” in criminal policymaking
“are more knowledgeable and personally concerned . . . than the general public”).
255. Bell, supra note 16, at 710.
256. See generally Levin, supra note 164; Levin, supra note 11.
257. Akbar, supra note 14, at 479.
258. See generally id.
259. See generally id.
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leave a lawyer’s mouth. Like police abolition. Abolishing the carceral state.
Ending prisons.”260
Indeed, this turn to lived experience as expertise has been a staple of recent
abolitionist theory and praxis.261 In this space, there’s often a focus on
experience as granting authority to make a claim. For example, a significant
amount of contemporary abolitionist organizing focuses on the experiences
of people who have suffered interpersonal or state violence.262 Part of the
significance of the turn to lived experience as expertise in this context is how
it complicates traditional framings of “victims’ rights.” Many activists
pushing for abolition or radical approaches to criminal law frame their
advocacy in terms of their own experiences of harm and violence.263 But, in
a departure from conventional framings of victim-centric advocacy, they
deploy narratives of their experiences to critique the criminal system.264 That
is, by showing that people who have experienced harm do not necessarily
favor punitive policies, this conception of expertise invites a broader
reckoning with what it would really mean to prioritize victims. Perhaps those
interventions would be punitive, but perhaps not.265
In a sense, this move resonates with intellectual and political traditions that
emphasize resituating and reshaping narratives. From the movement for

260. Introduction, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1568, 1568 (2019) (quoting Derecka Purnell).
261. While reflecting a different politics and movement, abolitionist organizing in
Scandinavia also has reflected a dynamic where currently and formerly incarcerated people
were incorporated into policy discussions about how to address issues with incarceration. See
MATHIESEN, supra note 175, at 5; see also McLeod, supra note 36, at 690.
262. See generally LEIGH GOODMARK, D ECRIMINALIZING D OMESTIC V IOLENCE: A
BALANCED P OLICY APPROACH TO INTIMATE P ARTNER V IOLENCE (2018); Patrisse Cullors,
Abolition and Reparations:
Histories of Resistance, Transformative Justice, and
Accountability, 132 HARV. L. R EV. 1684 (2019); McLeod, supra note 14.
263. See, e.g., Camonghne Felix, Aching for Abolition: As a Survivor of Sexual Violence,
I Know Prison Isn’t the Answer, THE CUT (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.thecut.com/2020/10/
aching-for-abolition.html [https://perma.cc/K3SV-VTHE] (“I am a survivor, and have been
for most of my life. I am also a prison abolitionist, and have been for most of my life . . . .”);
Victoria Law, How Can We Reconcile Prison Abolition with #MeToo?, FILTER
(Sept. 25, 2018), https://filtermag.org/how-can-we-reconcile-prison-abolition-with-metoo/
[https://perma.cc/66VM-JMG3].
264. But see Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. R EV . 741, 772 (2007)
(describing the concept of “the victim” as constructed to operate as a “tool of tough-on-crime
penological goals”).
265. See, e.g., Kelly Hayes & Mariame Kaba, The Sentencing of Larry Nassar Was Not
“Transformative Justice.” Here’s Why, THE APPEAL (Feb. 5, 2018), https://theappeal.org/
the-sentencing-of-larry-nassar-was-not-transformative-justice-here-s-why-a2ea323a6645/
[https://perma.cc/239Z-PGWX]; Mariame Kaba & Andrea J. Ritchie, Opinion, We Want More
Justice for Breonna Taylor than the System that Killed Her Can Deliver, ESSENCE (Dec. 6,
2020), https://www.essence.com/feature/breonna-taylor-justice-abolition/ [https://perma.cc/
L9S8-GUNR].
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participatory defense,266 to postcolonial theory,267 and critical race theory,268
this turn is hardly unprecedented.269 It represents an effort to rethink the
structures of “subjugated knowledge” or “hierarchies of knowledge.”270
And, such a move resonates with longstanding questions about how
marginalized and subordinated communities can exercise agency.271 This
conception of expertise therefore appears to closely resemble versions of
“standpoint epistemology,”272 “which asserts that . . . systematically
oppressed group[s] have superior knowledge of the character of their
oppression than other individuals. This knowledge allows them to see social
inequality and to challenge it where others cannot.”273 Taking Professor
Mari Matsuda’s formulation:
266. See Janet Moore et al., Make Them Hear You: Participatory Defense and the Struggle
for Criminal Justice Reform, 78 ALB . L. REV. 1281, 1289 (2015) (“[Participatory defense
empowers] those whom the lawyers represent to be change agents in their own right.
Participatory defense can trigger exponentially greater change—indeed, a cataclysmic
shake-up of the criminal justice system—by adding a huge number of strong new
voices . . . .”); Marisol Orihuela, Crim-Imm Lawyering, 34 GEO . IMMIGR . L.J. 613, 635
(2020).
267. See, e.g., Robin D.G. Kelly, A Poetics of Anticolonialism, in AIMÉ CÉSAIRE:
DISCOURSE ON COLONIALISM 7, 28 (Joan Pinkham trans., Monthly Rev. Press 2000) (1955);
GAYATRI C HAKRAVORTY S PIVAK, A CRITIQUE OF P OSTCOLONIAL R EASON: TOWARD A
HISTORY OF THE V ANISHING PRESENT 309 (1999). See generally Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271
(Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossber eds., 1988) [hereinafter Spivak, Can the Subaltern
Speak?].
268. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race
Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1760 (2003); Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Critical Race
Coalitions: Key Movements That Performed the Theory, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1377, 1407
(2000) (“The task of critical opposition is to disinter such knowledge in order to ‘establish a
historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today.’”).
269. Indeed, Akbar has argued that a turn to a movement-centric approach to criminal legal
transformation reflects a set of longstanding radical legal traditions focused on shifting
expertise. Akbar, supra note 14, at 424 (“The movement accepts and centers much of what
critical race theory and feminist law scholarship have argued for: the voices, the experience,
and the expertise of Black and other people of color, immigrants, women, LGBQ, trans, and
gender-nonconforming people.”).
270. See Michel Foucault, Two Lectures, in P OWER /KNOWLEDGE, supra note 24, at 78, 82
(“[B]y subjugated knowledges one should understand something else . . . namely, a whole set
of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently
elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level
of cognition or scientificity.”).
271. See generally FREIRE, supra note 24; Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, supra note
267.
272. Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò, Being-in-the-Room Privilege: Elite Capture and Epistemic
Deference,
P HILOSOPHER
(2020),
https://www.thephilosopher1923.org/essay-taiwo
[https://perma.cc/4MN6-3VKM] (“The deferential approach to standpoint epistemology often
comes packaged with concern and attention to the importance of lived experience.”).
273. Laura T. Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving, 33 FLA. S T. U. L. R EV. 1, 7–8 (2005).
See generally WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: P OWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE
MODERNITY 41–42 (1995); SANDRA H ARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE ? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE?
THINKING FROM WOMEN’ S LIVES 117–19 (1991); NANCY C.M. HARTSOCK, THE F EMINIST
STANDPOINT R EVISITED AND O THER ESSAYS (1998); Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal
Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 872–76 (1990) (describing and critiquing standpoint
epistemology); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies
and the Logic of Imagination, 70 TEX. L. REV. 109, 210 (1991); Dorothy E. Smith, Women’s
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[T]hose who have experienced discrimination speak with a special voice to
which we should listen. Looking to the bottom—adopting the perspective
of those who have seen and felt the falsity of the liberal promise—can assist
critical scholars in the task of fathoming the phenomenology of law and
defining the elements of justice.274

But, it is worth considering some of these recent academic arguments and
this third turn to expertise as something new and—at least in part—distinct
because of the language of expertise and the adoption of expertise as a frame
or vocabulary for advancing antisubordination interests.275 That is, scholars
and activists appear to be moving beyond seeing lived experience as
producing objects of study or even producing alternative frames for acquiring
knowledge276 to suggesting that lived experience should be seen as
producing authority.277 In this account, “[p]rivileging everyday knowledge
is an attempt to locate authority or expertise with those who experience a
circumstance rather than generating it from scholars, policymakers, or other
outsiders who lack access to authentic understanding of events, relationships,
behaviors, values, or historical antecedents to current phenomena.”278
For example, Professor James Binnall, a previously incarcerated
criminology professor, has called for greater attention to the “experiential
carceral knowledge” possessed by people with criminal records.279 Professor
Jocelyn Simonson has urged “scholars and reformers to imagine what it
would mean to temporarily set aside a desire for traditional ‘experts’ and
‘evidence-based’ practices” in debates about policing.280 Instead, she calls

Perspective as a Radical Critique of Sociology, reprinted in THE FEMINIST STANDPOINT
THEORY R EADER : INTELLECTUAL AND P OLITICAL CONTROVERSIES 21 (Sandra Harding ed.,
2004).
274. Matsuda, supra note 24, at 324. But see Devon W. Carbado, Critical What What?, 43
CONN. L. REV. 1593, 1637 (2011) (expressing skepticism about the role or necessity of certain
aspects of narrative and standpoint theory in critical race theory).
275. See Cynthia Godsoe, Participatory Defense: Humanizing the Accused and Ceding
Control to the Client, 69 MERCER L. REV. 715, 715 (2018) (“[E]mpowering defendants’
families to assist or even challenge defense attorneys . . . is truly radical. It shifts notions of
expertise and questions deeply-embedded power structures between attorneys and clients.”);
Simonson, Police Reform, supra note 16, at 838–43.
276. See Joanne Conaghan, Schlag in Wonderland, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 543, 561–62
(2003) (“[T]o invoke the notion of standpoint is not necessarily to invoke the idea of an
epistemically privileged position.”); Susan H. Williams, Utopianism, Epistemology, and
Feminist Theory, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 289, 308 (1993) (“[T]hose excluded from the
dominant culture can and do develop alternative perspectives critical of that culture. . . . [But]
such alternative perspectives [do not] have any prima facie epistemic advantage over the
dominant culture.”).
277. I mean “authority” here in the sense not only of providing legitimate knowledge but
also in the sense of contributing to, or perhaps even enacting, policy or contributing to
governance.
278. BETH E. RICHIE, ARRESTED J USTICE: B LACK WOMEN, V IOLENCE, AND AMERICA’S
P RISON NATION 130 (2012).
279. James M. Binnall, Carceral Wisdom, INQUEST (Oct. 15, 2021), https://inquest.org/
carceral-wisdom/ [https://perma.cc/HL5Z-CMN7].
280. Simonson, Police Reform, supra note 16, at 788 (footnotes omitted).
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for “shifting power to policed populations” and focusing on “movement”
arguments.281 This approach, she argues,
brings a different view of expertise, and promotes a different kind of
expert. . . . [S]ocial movement visions of power shifting are not just about
taking power away from elite actors. They also come with very specific,
even if sometimes contradictory, ideas about to whom power should be
given: “directly impacted” people; people who live in particular
neighborhoods; people with criminal records; Black, Latinx, and
Indigenous People. These are populations who live in “race-class
subjugated communities” who not only tend not to have much political
power, but who are also consistently excluded from most forms of public
participation in the criminal legal system. Under the power lens, these
people do not just become important subjects of policing governance; they
become experts themselves.282

As Simonson describes it, activists’ demands for greater involvement in the
lawmaking process are “centered on a key idea: that directly impacted people
are themselves the policy experts on ‘public safety’ to whom we should be
listening for specific, grounded proposals for change.”283
Similarly, Akbar argues that focusing on social movements and
subordinated or marginalized communities is not just a vehicle to achieve
better outcomes or to advance a given political agenda.284 Rather, the project
“is about a vision to imagine expertise very differently than law
scholarship.”285 And, Professor Monica Bell has argued that,
as subordinates of the criminal justice system, members of marginalized
communities are especially knowledgeable about systemic injustice and
thus especially capable of and responsible for rectifying it. System
participants, then, should cede power to those directly affected not only
because it may make the system more just, but also because it will enable
directly affected individuals and communities to better meet their own
societal obligations.286

Nevertheless, adopting perhaps a more pluralist conception, Bell also asks:
“How do we hold space for both the (bounded) expertise of academics and
technocrats and the (bounded) expertise of the people who could benefit most
from the achievement of racial and economic justice, those who will suffer
most if it continues to elude us?”287
Ultimately, Bell’s question invites deeper engagement with how bounded
expertise is and whether, or to what extent, this third conception of expertise

281. Id. at 787.
282. Id. at 850–51 (footnotes omitted); cf. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Scattered
Speculations on the Subaltern and the Popular, 8 P OSTCOLONIAL S TUD. 475, 482 (2005)
(arguing that Western academics should “learn from below, from the subaltern, rather than
only study him(her)”).
283. Simonson, Police Reform, supra note 16, at 829.
284. See Akbar, supra note 14, at 425.
285. Id.
286. Bell, supra note 43, at 208 (citation omitted).
287. Bell, supra note 16, at 712.
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is pluralist or represents an alternative model of exclusive governance to the
ones proposed by some supporters of more traditional technocracy.288 But,
whatever approach to policymaking this expert turn takes, it demonstrates
that “the relations between politics and culture on the one hand and
knowledge on the other are neither fixed nor definitively knowable.”289 That
is, there is nothing natural about a social ordering that constructs expertise in
one way or that allows experts a certain role in the political or policymaking
process.290
B. Reconstructing Expertise
In many ways, the deconstructive move that leads to the third conception
of expertise is powerful and necessary. It takes advocates of technocracy
seriously on their own terms but challenges the underlying assumptions of
that approach. In doing so, advocates of lived experience as expertise
highlight the weak points in the technocratic turn. They illustrate the ways
in which defining expertise and deferring to experts is fundamentally a
political project that cannot be insulated from politics and value judgments.
And, they help to underscore the limitations of thinking about expertise and
democracy as conceptually distinct and in tension when it comes to setting
criminal policy.291
Additionally, the third model of expertise helps to drive home the ways in
which the criminal system, as a vehicle of social control and for managing
populations, so often excludes the voices of those most directly affected by
both crime and law enforcement.292 It suggests that the criminal system
cannot simply be an object of study and that many claims about the epistemic
advantage of elite actors and traditional experts reflects a skepticism about
the abilities of historically marginalized communities to engage in
meaningful self-governance.

288. See infra Part IV.B.3.
289. Schlag, supra note 18, at 71.
290. See infra Part IV.B.3; see also Levin, supra note 11, at 637 (“[R]egardless of
discipline, training, or method, we might be tempted to reenact the ‘questionable binary’ that
would elevate one form of critique or study over another. Maybe that binary has its place.
But . . . ‘criminal justice thinking’ can take many forms. We neglect those forms and those
voices at our peril.”); Ocen, supra note 16, at 228 (“I argue for the explicit inclusion of external
actors, such as community activists, who are often unaccounted for in empirical projects
despite their important role in driving institutional action.”).
291. Cf. Dubber, supra note 140, at 99 (arguing that a new “penal code” should grapple
with “principles that connect the penal law to the power of a democratic state over its
constituents”).
292. See Rahman & Simonson, supra note 48, at 698 (“[W]hen people directly affected by
the criminal legal system attempt to intervene in policy debates over criminal law and
procedure, they find their calls muted because they are members of a population that has been
systematically disenfranchised by the very systems of criminal law that they aim to reform.”);
Jain, supra note 250, at 954 (describing “a profound disconnect between the lived experience
of misdemeanants and the legal doctrines that govern the criminal law”); Moore et al., supra
note 266, at 1286 (describing strategies to empower “the people who are most directly affected
by criminal justice systems”); Levin, supra note 11, at 622 n.20 (collecting sources).
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Those insights make the intervention a powerful one. Nevertheless, in this
section, I ask several questions raised by this third concept of expertise.
Might the turn to a new group of experts—not simply as a way to undercut
the old models of expertise, but as an earnest embrace of new figures of
power—risk re-entrenching some of the same problems that accompanied the
traditional models of expertise? In this section, I articulate the ways that even
a more radical and democratized conception of expertise might raise similar
questions as the traditional models. To be clear, that this (or any other)
conception raises questions or might be susceptible to critique doesn’t mean
it may not also be worth advancing or embracing; rather, I see raising and
striving to address any such questions as an important piece of the theoretical
and political project of reimagining the criminal system.293 Or, as Professor
Ruth Wilson Gilmore put it in describing the interplay between scholarship
and activism, “[I]n scholarly research, answers are only as good as the further
questions they provoke . . . .”294
1. Democratization or Decarceration?
Perhaps the most obvious question raised by lived expertise as a model
sounds very much like a common critique of democratization more generally:
this approach may shift power to the people,295 but will it serve decarceral
ends? As argued above, the educational expert might actually retain the sort
of punitive instincts associated with populism and democratic criminal
politics. But, recognizing the punitivism of elite actors shouldn’t lead us to
dismiss out-of-hand critiques of punitive populism. In other words,
punitivism and the addiction to carceral solutions that pervade U.S. politics
might cross a range of axes of identity and social status.
Several recent critical accounts of the turn to “democratic” or
community-focused approaches to criminal justice transformation have
stressed the tension between the goals of democratization and decarceration.
That is, giving more power to “the people” needn’t yield less punitive
approaches to criminal law.296 Or, as Professor Trevor Gardner contends, “It
would be a categorical mistake to equate the pursuit of an equitable process
of crime policymaking—even as it relates to race-class subordinated
communities—with the pursuit of equitable crime policy.”297 Prioritizing
293. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text; cf. Pierre Schlag, A Reply—The
Missing Portion, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1029, 1037 (2003) (“Among those critical theorists
who seek to contest . . . expertise, one can distinguish two approaches. One approach is to try
to reveal the emptiness of the claims to expertise among the legal intelligentsia and to reveal
how these claims nonetheless gain power. Another approach is to try to relocate the authority
to say what the law is among those who have been excluded. I do not see these approaches as
antithetical, but rather as complementary.”).
294. RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: P RISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND
OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING C ALIFORNIA 27 (2007).
295. See generally Simonson, Police Reform, supra note 16 (articulating this
power-shifting frame for considering questions of criminal policy).
296. See generally Gardner, supra note 50; Rappaport, supra note 12.
297. Gardner, supra note 50, at 805. Gardner explains the distinction further: “[T]he
pursuit of equitable crime policymaking pertains to the specific means by which crime policy
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democratic values and “equitable process” might be an important goal, and
so too might prioritizing decarceration and “equitable crime policy.” But it’s
not inevitable that these goals always will be congruent. Whether, where,
and to what extent the goals might conflict or overlap remain empirical
questions.
Studies reflect a range of answers. Perhaps people from marginalized
communities who have borne the brunt of mass incarceration and who are
disproportionately subject to policing actually don’t want to see the
institutions of the carceral state expanded, but instead want different vehicles
for achieving accountability or public safety.298 Or, perhaps people who
have experienced interpersonal violence or who have lived in marginalized
communities actually do want more involvement from law enforcement.299
Or, perhaps most likely, it’s a mix that reflects the diversity of views and
voices within any community.300
And, whatever individuals’ or
communities’ preferences might be, how are those preferences shaped and
restricted by sociocultural understandings of punishment, by politics, and by
a constrained menu of policy options?301
There are no right or wrong answers to the question of policy or process
as the touchstone. But, I think that question, or the tension, should be an
important part of how to think about this concept (or any concept)302 of
expertise. Indeed, the concept of experiential expertise might reinforce the
sort of punitive, victim-centric politics and policies of the conventional
victims’ rights movement.303 And, even if this victim-centric focus looks
different than the tough-on-crime victims’ rights movement, it still may shift
even more power away from criminal defendants.304

is promulgated, while the pursuit of equitable crime policy pertains to the substance of crime
policy itself.” Id.
298. See generally Cullors, supra note 262 (arguing for noncriminal forms of
accountability); Gruber, supra note 264 (same); Kaba & Ritchie, supra note 265 (same).
299. See generally MICHAEL J AVEN FORTNER , B LACK SILENT MAJORITY: THE
ROCKEFELLER DRUG LAWS AND THE P OLITICS OF P UNISHMENT (2015) (arguing that many
Black voters supported punitive policies); RANDALL K ENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW
(1997) (arguing that failure to protect Black victims from crime is a civil rights and equality
issue); Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1717 (2006)
(arguing that underenforcement of crime harms marginalized communities that are
disproportionately victimized).
300. See Gardner, supra note 50, at 9–11 (discussing the challenge in identifying the views
and will of an entire community); see also infra Part IV.B.2.
301. See generally FORMAN, supra note 7; MILLER , supra note 9; Reginald Dwayne Betts,
Kamala Harris, Mass Incarceration and Me, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/20/magazine/kamala-harris-crime-prison.html
[https://perma.cc/2RQW-JJTF].
302. See supra Part III.B.2.
303. See Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1436 (1993)
(“The victims’ rights movements . . . celebrated subjectivity, embraced contextual judgments,
and emphasized that the most credible truth claims would be those from the most oppressed
people. They criticized the criteria for truth that neglected perceptions of oppressed people.”
(footnote omitted)).
304. See Gruber, supra note 264, at 772 (“[T]he victim must occupy a specific, predefined
legal space, such that granting her ‘rights’ will necessarily lead to more incarceration for the
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2. Whose Experiences?
One of the draws of understanding lived experience as expertise is the
possibility of breaking down the expert/nonexpert distinction. This
deconstructive potential further promises to highlight the politicized and
contingent nature of the expert’s certification or qualification in the first
place.305 Yet, if the expert frame is still retained and is still meant to do
work,306 the same threshold questions remain: Who is an expert? And,
maybe more importantly, who gets to decide who is an expert? If expertise,
in this third conception, still rests on qualification or certification, the
prospect of qualifying or certifying the experiential expert strikes me as
potentially worrisome. To the extent that the arbiter of expertise remains
some relatively elite or powerful actor (e.g., a politician, an agency, an
academic, or an advocate in a leadership position), then how democratic is it,
really?307 In other words, rather than shifting authority or power to the
experiential expert, there’s a risk that power (at least some amount of it) will
continue to rest with the arbiter of expertise.308
Perhaps for some commentators that is a worthwhile risk to take, as this
model of expertise still would shift power to previously marginalized
voices.309 As Simonson argues, “Our job right now might be to put aside our
measurement devices and listen to the calls from movement actors as they
ask us to recalibrate our understandings of justice, safety, and power.”310
That is, perhaps if the arbiter also were someone outside of the dominant

defendant.”); Minow, supra note 303, at 1436–37 (tying the victims’ rights movement to
standpoint theory).
305. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Content, Method, and
Epistemology of Gender in Sociolegal Studies, 25 LAW & SOC ’Y R EV. 221, 232 (1991) (noting
“the social situatedness of all of our work”).
306. As discussed throughout, maybe the language of expertise is meant to be evacuated of
significance by scholars and activists who adopt this third vision of expertise. That is, maybe
appealing to the language of expertise is simply a means of entering into and participating in
a broader dialogue, policymaking framework, and political economy; it is not meant to imply
or accept the sort of epistemic hierarchy invoked by traditional expertise. Or, framed
differently, perhaps expertise simply operates as a shorthand for standing or legitimate
authority to express an opinion.
307. Bell raises the question of how (white) elites consume and interact with the sorts of
“expertise” or subordinated knowledge that define this third conception:
Ghetto abolition should entail reconsidering how we consume the testimonies of
people living at America’s margins. How do we hear these testimonies? . . . Does
depicting the suffering . . . merely satisfy the liberal elite demand for poverty porn?
Trauma porn? Do seeing and feeling . . . testimonies illuminate the structural
reasons for their suffering—as I hope it does—or do their individual stories obscure
social structure and simply induce white pity and shame?
Bell, supra note 16, at 711.
308. See Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, supra note 267, at 287 (discussing the problem
of “the historian, transforming ‘insurgency’ into ‘text for knowledge’”); id. at 292 (describing
the “dangerous[ness]” of “the first-world intellectual masquerading as the absent
nonrepresenter who lets the oppressed speak for themselves”).
309. See generally Simonson, Police Reform, supra note 16 (arguing that “power shifting”
is the appropriate lens through which to view criminal legal reforms).
310. Simonson, Power over Policing, supra note 16.
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social/political/cultural class, there would be even less concern: power
would rest exclusively outside of the traditional spaces of dominance. But,
I’m not sure, in part because one’s insider/outsider identity is not necessarily
clear and uncontested—movement, community, and experience are fraught,
heterodox, uncertain, and perhaps conflicting.311
By way of example, consider the recent public debate between police
abolition and reform activists. In the midst of widespread protests during the
summer of 2020, Campaign Zero, an organization founded by activists and
organizers in the wake of the 2015 Ferguson uprising, launched a campaign
branded #8CantWait.312 The campaign proposed eight “data-backed
policies” that were designed to reduce police violence (particularly violence
against Black people).313 In response, abolitionist activists launched an
alternate website and campaign: #8toAbolition.314 The creators of
#8toAbolition explicitly framed their campaign and set of proposals as a
radical alternative to #8CantWait.315
Where #8CantWait proposed
“reformist reforms” that would improve policing, #8toAbolition set out to
dismantle police as an institution.316
To the extent that some version of the turn to lived experience as expertise
involves a call to defer to “The Movement,” which of these campaigns
represents The Movement? Perhaps the answer is the more radical “8 to
Abolition”—its authors and organizers grounded their claims in the work of
other activists and organizers, whereas “8 Can’t Wait” adopted a model
familiar to the realm of educational expertise and rooted in statistical
arguments about efficient, technocratic oversight.317 But, answering this
question, I contend, requires some political or value judgment, particularly
for those outside The Movement.318 If “[e]xpertise is special knowledge
311. Some advocates of this turn to a third concept of expertise respond to this concern by
advocating for greater academic involvement in political and social movements, which may
allow for a greater understanding or awareness of where such fault lines lie—of who is truly
in the movement or who speaks for the movement. Nevertheless, questions about how
officials or relative insiders define the boundaries of subordinated or marginalized identities
remain tricky. Cf. Scott Skinner-Thompson, Identity by Committee, 57 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript on file with author) (raising concerns about schools’
function in policing the boundaries of student gender identity and classification).
312. See Daniel Kreps, Campaign Zero’s ‘8 Can’t Wait’ Project Aims to Curtail Police
Violence, ROLLING STONE (June 4, 2020, 1:02 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/
culture-news/campaign-zero-8-cant-wait-police-violence-1010013/ [https://perma.cc/2P7WF3YA]; #8CANTWAIT, https://8cantwait.org/ [https://perma.cc/C7SA-9NUZ] (last visited
Apr. 2, 2022).
313. See #8CANTWAIT, supra note 312.
314. See #8TOABOLITION, https://www.8toabolition.com/ [https://perma.cc/WV6P-E5FT]
(last visited Apr. 2, 2022); see also Edward Ongweso, Jr., “Defund the Police” Actually
Means Defunding the Police, V ICE (June 9, 2020), https://www.vice.com/en/article/
ep4xy7/what-does-defund-and-abolish-the-police-mean [https://perma.cc/NE52-SZ63].
315. See supra note 314.
316. See supra note 314.
317. Compare
Authors,
#8TOABOLITION,
https://www.8toabolition.com/authors
[https://perma.cc/WJ6H-VMZN] (last visited Apr. 2, 2022), with 8 CAN’T WAIT, RESEARCH
BASIS
(2022),
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1YW132-LCtECh0zFHxMGZVHnv8NLHhZjfihdDApWXow/edit [https://perma.cc/Z88U-VKZZ].
318. But see supra note 311.
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made real as authority in struggle,” then that struggle (or those struggles)
must be taken seriously.319 To the extent that any Movement contains
movements and might always stand on the verge of fracture or at least
fragmentation, what approach should be used in assessing which voices,
experiences, or movements to privilege?
And, what about other
movements—movements with very different worldviews or politics?320
To be clear, these are questions for any conception of expertise—expertise
and claims to expertise rest on (and often paper over) political struggle, and
the places where debates about expertise are the most important are also the
places where there might be competing expert claims. But, just as that
question should shape our understanding of educational or vocational
expertise, it also should be a part of any turn to experiential expertise.
(Indeed, Professors Akbar, Simonson, and Sameer Ashar’s call for a new
method of scholarship that is embedded in a movement consciousness or
ethos may reflect such focus or a desire to better understand the contours of
any movement or subordinated identity as a component of such an expert
turn.)321
Further, and perhaps relatedly, one challenge remains: the lack of a
monolithic community or movement.322 Put differently, lived experience
remains omnipresent—we have all experienced what we have experienced,
and we might be said to be experts in aspects of our experience filtered
through our cultural context, community, or background. But, the animating
impulse for this contemporary turn to lived experience as expertise remains
a focus on centering the voices and experiences of those who previously had
been marginalized or left out of the policymaking process. While I think
that’s an important priority and should be an important component of any
movement for criminal justice reform or transformation, understanding this
move in terms of expertise and deference to experts may be easier said than
done.323
As philosopher Professor Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò observes, “the norms of
putting standpoint epistemology into practice call for practices of deference,”
but “[t]he rooms of power and influence are at the end of causal chains that
319. KENNEDY, supra note 38, at 120.
320. For example, many contemporary abolitionist accounts center the organizing work
and narratives of survivors of interpersonal and/or state violence, who have rejected punitive,
criminal responses. See supra note 298. But, viewing expertise in this light, what should we
make of the conventional victims’ rights movement? To the extent that activists associated
with that movement are less deserving of deference (and maybe they are not), is that because
of a judgment about their political commitments, or their (experiential) expert qualifications?
321. See generally Amna A. Akbar et al., Movement Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. 821 (2021).
322. See Gardner, supra note 50; Bernard E. Harcourt, Matrioshka Dolls, in TRACEY L.
MEARES & D AN K AHAN, URGENT TIMES: P OLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER -CITY
COMMUNITIES 81 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999).
323. In raising this concern, I seek to draw from and build on the important work of Monica
Bell, Katherine Beckett, and Forrest Stuart, who argue that “just governance requires careful
attention to (though not uncritical deference to) knowledge from ‘below,’ or expertise that
emanates from lived experience.” Monica C. Bell, Katherine Beckett & Forrest Stuart,
Investing in Alternatives: Three Logics of Criminal System Replacement, 11 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 1291, 1326 (2021).
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have selection effects.”324 Therefore, the “very strength of standpoint
epistemology—its recognition of the importance of perspective—becomes
its weakness when combined with deferential practical norms. . . . For those
who are deferred to, [deference politics] can supercharge group-undermining
norms.”325 Put differently, an expert frame that requires or invites deference
based on a presumed experiential representativeness might in and of itself
undercut the potential for representativeness.
Recurring in decades of commentary on “community control” of police
has been an overarching question of who is “the community” and how to go
about defining “community will.”326 Writing during the height of an earlier
iteration of debates about community control, Harcourt observed that
“empower[ing] the majority within a minority community” as a solution to
the lack of community control over crime policy resembles
a Russian matrioshka doll. When you open that doll, you find another: at
each level of the majority/minority issue, we are faced with the same
problem—the risk that the majority (now of the minority community)
won’t bear the burdens of its laws but instead will infringe upon the liberty
of a powerless or despised minority within it.327

Some form of subordination and marginalization remains a risk inherent in
any governance project, particularly any such project that appears to create
or entrench some set of dominant actors. And, given the dynamics at play in
a system of expertise, it seems fair to ask whether and to what extent these
nested hierarchies might be re-entrenched, and—if they are—how to go
about undercutting those hierarchies.328
3. Self-Governance or Community Control?
Finally, this third model of expertise invites the same questions as any
other expert turn: Does recognizing this class or category of experts imply
that they possess an epistemic advantage such that they exclusively should
govern and make policy? Or, does recognizing this category of expertise
simply suggest that society should recognize a new or additional set of voices
in the policymaking process?329
As Gardner argues, one question posed by this move or
reconceptualization is what the new model of governance or policymaking
will look like:

324. Táíwò, supra note 272.
325. Id.
326. See generally MEARES & K AHAN, supra note 322 (collecting essays expressing
various positions on this question).
327. Harcourt, supra note 322, at 81, 87.
328. See Táíwò, supra note 272. For example, Táíwò argues that the answer might come
in the form of shifting from a deference-based model to a “constructive” one, where identity
and experience do not provide a “special right to speak” but instead bring perspective and
build community. Id.
329. See Okidegbe, supra note 16, at 37 (describing a “spectrum” of “decision-making
power”).
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Power reallocation . . . will in some instances require the inclusion of
individuals and groups at the social margins, giving them the proverbial
seat at the table. Alternatively, it may mean something along the lines of
minority exclusivity in crime policymaking. In which case, racial
minorities, race-class minorities, and those bearing the mark of a criminal
record are given not merely a seat at the table, but a table in which every
seat is occupied by a member of a subordinate class.330

To be clear, these are dramatically different outcomes. And, either is
theoretically and normatively defensible. But, choosing between the two
requires a significant unpacking of the ends to be served. The former
suggests a commitment to pluralism or to opening up the process of criminal
policymaking:
individuals and communities who previously were
systematically excluded should instead be seen as valued (and necessary)
contributors to the process of setting criminal policy. In contrast, the latter
suggests the maintenance of an exclusionary process but reimagines that
process as altering the set of privileged voices. That is, “the project of
including the socially marginalized in the crime-policymaking process may
culminate in a policymaking process exclusive to the marginal.”331 And,
indeed, such a decision about the role of such experts in any decision-making
process need not reflect “an on-off switch, but . . . rather [could suggest] a
continuum ranging from a body whose recommendations are merely
advisory, at one extreme, to a body with complete, non-reviewable control
over policies and decisions that govern local services, at the other.”332
Expertise as a frame and vocabulary implies exclusivity: calling someone
an expert both presumes and also establishes that others are nonexperts.333
Indeed, the power of the expertise claim generally rests on its exclusivity.
Expertise presupposes that expert knowledge is of worth because other
nonexperts do not possess it.334
Depending on one’s vision of social change, perhaps that exclusivity is a
good thing. Perhaps, if the right experts were identified, it would advance
Simonson’s vision of “power shifting,” empowering movement actors and
individuals from marginalized communities.335 Yet, this logic of expertise
cannot help but stand in tension against norms or values of broader
participation.336 Even if expertise and technocracy become somehow
330. Gardner, supra note 50, at 802 (footnotes omitted).
331. Id. at 805.
332. Rahman & Simonson, supra note 48, at 720; see also Okidegbe, supra note 16, at 37
(describing a “spectrum” or approaches to incorporating community “expertise” into the
design of pretrial risk assessment instruments).
333. See JACQUES D ERRIDA, O F GRAMMATOLOGY 141–64 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1976) (describing this sort of “diacritical” relationship).
334. See Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas, Politics, Institutional Structures, and the Rise of
Economics: A Comparative Study, 30 THEORY & SOC ’Y 397, 397 (2001) (tracing the power
of economics to its status as “the most well-bounded and organized scholarly enterprise in the
social scientific field”).
335. See generally Simonson, Police Reform, supra note 16.
336. See Mary Grisez Kweit & Robert W. Kweit, The Politics of Policy Analysis: The Role
of Citizen Participation in Analytic Decision Making, in CITIZEN P ARTICIPATION IN P UBLIC
DECISION M AKING 19, 29 (Jack DeSario & Stuart Langton eds., 1987) (“Technocratic
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disentangled, there is still a risk that appeals to expertise suggest that only
some subset of the polity is qualified to decide or opine. If the logic of this
move is one of reparations or anti-subordination—shifting power to a
previously disempowered group—the exclusionary aspect of the project
might be justified, or even desirable.337 That is, if the goal of this third model
of expertise isn’t democratic, but rather is rooted in ensuring that previously
marginalized or disenfranchised groups are able to wield power, then perhaps
that concern is irrelevant. (Indeed, perhaps this objection represents a feature
of the model, not a bug.) But, it is important to recognize the risk that the
expert turn here—as elsewhere—limits the possible universe of policy
solutions or the legal imaginaries. Or, “by withdrawing political questions
from the public sphere and giving them over to expert decisionmaking,
technocratic rationality actually diminishes the possibility of democratic
debate over ends, in the name of an improved analysis of means.”338
Further, as discussed in the previous section, this vision continues to raise
questions about relative marginality, the homogeneity of “the community,”
and who should be authorized to speak on behalf of a larger group as expert.
Those may be answerable questions, but they are difficult questions. And
approaching them requires a serious conversation, both about who makes
those decisions of representativeness and whether and to what extent it is
acceptable that some voices might continue to be further marginalized in any
such expert-based governance process.
Additionally, returning to the discussion of whether this model of expertise
is necessarily decarceral, I think it’s fair to ask whether retaining an expert
frame facilitates self-governance or whether it shifts control over existing
mechanisms and institutions of governance.339 Maybe that distinction isn’t
terribly meaningful—what is self-governance if not control of the reins of
power? But, if the institutions of the criminal system are identified as
fundamentally unjust, illegitimate, or designed to weed out and punish the
most marginal in any community or space, how sanguine should
commentators be about a power shift that does not require dismantling the
underlying structures of state violence?340

methods are tools that seem to limit the role of public participation . . . [and] justify and reify
the wishes of a few.”).
337. See generally Simonson, Police Reform, supra note 16.
338. Boyle, supra note 145, at 751.
339. See M. Adams & Max Rameau, Black Community Control over Police, 2016 WIS. L.
REV. 515, 519 (calling for “[d]emocratic community control over the organs of the state
granted the consent of the governed to carry arms, deny people their freedom, and even kill
through the exercise of the state monopoly on violence”); see also Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò, Power
over the Police, DISSENT (June 12, 2020), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_
articles/power-over-the-police [https://perma.cc/UAA5-2Y28].
340. To be clear, some of the academics and activists who have adopted this rhetoric have
done so in the context of arguments in favor of abolition. But, as Simonson notes, “power
shifting is not inherently abolitionist, or even left-leaning; community control, for instance,
could be an institution that people who want more policing take up.” Simonson, Police
Reform, supra note 16, at 809.
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And, there’s still a question about whether “expertise” is the best way of
describing the phenomenon. By way of example, consider the justifications
for the right to vote in a representative democracy. Arguments for suffrage
are not commonly grounded in a logic of expertise. For example, I have the
right to vote for the City Council in Boulder, Colorado, not because I have
some particular knowledge or expertise when it comes to Boulder. Indeed, I
know more about other cities in which I cannot vote, and I’m sure that other
people who cannot vote in Boulder (because of criminal record, age,
residency, citizenship, etc.) know more about the city than I. Instead, I can
vote in Boulder because I live here, and government officials therefore
recognize me as a part of a polity entitled to some degree of self-governance.
If, instead, suffrage were premised on expertise, then we might enter a world
favored by commentators concerned about so-called “political ignorance,”
where self-governance is a privilege reserved for individuals who know
“enough” about governance or their jurisdiction.341
Expertise might become a shorthand for legitimacy and standing, but I
wonder whether that rhetorical or framing move has costs in that it implies
an acceptance of the logic of qualified participation in governance.342
To the extent that community control is unsatisfactory or to the extent that
end is not desired by commenters who embrace this third vision of expertise,
we are left with democratized expertise as a pluralistic or denaturalizing tool.
In other words, if expertise has become the vehicle for legitimating
participation, then certifying a new class of experts suggests that expertise
either should be devalued (e.g., if everyone is an expert, what good does the
classification do?)343 or should mean something different—perhaps a
vocabulary for describing relative sources of knowledge that might be useful
rather than dispositive. To me, this possibility of expert fluidity is part of
what makes expanding conceptions of expertise so exciting. But, it is
possible that some proponents of this model of expertise are less interested
in such a defanged conception and are interested instead in an alternative
technocratic framework that does treat expertise as authoritative and
exclusive. If the goal is governance by expert, it is all the more important to
answer the first two questions raised in this section—whether
democratization or decarceration is the overarching goal, and who qualifies
as an experiential expert. Put differently, if expertise were simply an
341. See, e.g., Jonah Goldberg, Opinion, Too Uninformed to Vote?, L.A. TIMES (July 31,
2007),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-oe-goldberg31jul31-column.html
[https://perma.cc/L2L6-6Q3L] (“Instead of making it easier to vote, maybe we should be
making it harder. Why not test people about the basic functions of government? Immigrants
have to pass a test to vote; why not all citizens?”).
342. See Schlag, supra note 293, at 1037 (“[B]oth approaches [i.e., deconstructing expert
authority and shifting expert authority] will in fact reinscribe, will performatively reinforce,
precisely the sort of rhetorics and hierarchies they contest. No way around that.”).
343. See Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race
Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1241, 1279 (1993)
(“Since all standpoints are equally validated (or invalidated), there is no longer any compelling
reason to privilege any viewpoint. . . . [M]y personal narrative is as relevant as your personal
narrative, and since both of them are equally relevant, they are equally irrelevant.”).
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instrumental concept designed to democratize and reimagine the hierarchies
of policymaking, perhaps the exact contours of expertise would hold less
importance. If, however, experts are framed as possessing significant
epistemic advantage or greater institutional legitimacy, these questions take
on greater weight because the classification of expertise “transforms what
may be cultural or political issues—sites of contestation and creativity—into
questions of expert knowledge.”344
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, expertise retains significant allure in no small part because it
offers a commonly accepted language of legitimacy.345 In some sense, my
goal in this Article has been less to critique the language of expertise than to
raise questions about the claims of legitimacy and authority that tend to
accompany the expert turn.346 There might be good reasons to embrace, or
at least accept “expertise” and the promise of the bounded, specialized
knowledge that it offers. And, indeed, I think there are. But acknowledging
that some actors know more about certain facts; have a greater appreciation
of certain issues; or have more time, skills, or resources to address certain
problems needn’t (and shouldn’t) mean accepting a claim that there is a
natural, clear, and unassailable hierarchy of knowledge that can be used to
assess truth and craft “best” policies in the criminal system.347
My hope in this Article has been to suggest that recognizing different,
competing, and complementary claims to expertise should help us appreciate
the deep political questions that underlie how criminal law is made and
enforced. That is, I don’t mean to dismiss the potential value of each
epistemic frame or the knowledge/truth claim that different “experts” might
bring to the table. Rather, I mean to critique the sort of exclusivity or
inflexibility that “expertise” as a frame might invite.
One of the deep pathologies of the U.S. criminal system is its
naturalization—the way in which the “is” and “ought” are elided in
discussions of criminal policy.348 That criminalization and prosecution

344. Schlag, supra note 18, at 71 (footnote omitted).
345. See BRINT, supra note 105, at 8 (“[E]xpert knowledge has enjoyed a virtually
unquestioned legitimacy in American culture.”).
346. See Samuel Moyn, Knowledge and Politics in International Law, 129 HARV. L. REV.
2164, 2165 (2016) (reviewing DAVID K ENNEDY, A WORLD OF S TRUGGLE : HOW P OWER ,
LAW, AND EXPERTISE SHAPE GLOBAL P OLITICAL ECONOMY (2016)) (“[S]tudying experts
was . . . the great device of delegitimation, with unclear consequences.”).
347. I see this observation as consistent with Lvovsky’s characterization of expertise as
functioning as a “professional technology,” rather than a “virtue.” See Lvovsky, supra note 6,
at 540–45. As Lvovsky describes the distinction, “it is . . . possible to imagine expertise
differently: not as a virtue of any sort, but, simply enough, as a professional technology—one
that increases the proficiency of expert actors without any inherent bearing on the legality or
legitimacy of their conduct.” Id. at 545.
348. See generally Benjamin Levin, De-Naturalizing Criminal Law: Of Public
Perceptions and Procedural Protections, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1777 (2013); Alice Ristroph,
Farewell to the Felonry, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 563, 564 (2018); Alice Ristroph, The
Definitive Article, 68 U. TORONTO L.J. 140, 150 (2018) [hereinafter Ristroph, The Definitive
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operate as the dominant vehicles for signaling that society takes a problem
seriously needn’t mean that they should be. That arrest, conviction, and
incarceration have become synonymous with accountability does not mean
that they should be. And, that police have become the agents of the state
tasked with responding to social problems does not mean that they need to
be. Put simply, the institutions of the criminal system are not inevitable or
natural. They are the product of struggle, of political decisions, of
compromise, and of inertia.
Addressing the violence and massive societal imprint of the carceral state
requires denaturalizing these institutions, recognizing their noninevitability,
and examining the roads not taken or alternatives not chosen.349 A range of
actors with different experiences and knowledge bases—different
expertises—have been and will be a part of that effort. To address these
problems and move out of the shadow of past efforts, though, requires not
only new experts but also a new understanding of expertise—one that
recognizes that expertise, like the other institutions of the criminal system, is
in need of denaturalizing so that we (whoever we may be) can confront and
contest the values, politics, and decisions that undergird it.

Article] (reviewing LINDSAY FARMER,
AND CRIMINALIZATION (2016)).
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349. See Ristroph, The Definitive Article, supra note 348, at 165.

